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ABSTRACT  The Lesotho Highlands Water Project, a joint development effort of the
governments of Lesotho and South Africa, involved the construction of several large dams and 
other infrastructure such as roads, bridges, and power lines. The purpose of the dam and water 
transfer project was to provide water to the Gauteng region of South Africa and electricity to
Lesotho. Phase 1B of the project, the Mohale Dam, resulted in the displacement of over 320
households and the inundation of villages, fi elds, and grazing lands. In line with the 1986
Treaty between the governments of Lesotho and South Africa, the project authorities provided 
compensation for losses suffered and put in place development projects in an effort to promote
economic self-suffi ciency. This article assesses the degree to which project-affected people in
the Lesotho highlands were actively engaged in planning and decision-making regarding their 
own resettlement and rehabilitation, and the extent to which public participation contributed to
their subsequent welfare.
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INTRODUCTION
Most large dams are built to provide power or water to people other than those
who have to make the sacrifi ces necessary for the dams to be built. The people
who lose their land and perhaps their homes, their communities, their jobs, the
graves of their ancestors, and the abodes of their spirits seldom enjoy the  benefi ts,
and suffer many of the inconveniences, of these projects. The resettlement and 
compensation of the losers have generally been regarded by the responsible author-
ities as an awkward necessity, to be undertaken at the lowest possible cost.
The water harnessed by these dams, and in some countries the land occupied by
the project, are often, under the law, considered to be national resources to which
the local residents have only secondary rights. For political and economic reasons,
large dam projects are often regarded by their proponents and by governments to
be in the national interest and therefore to take precedence over any local interests.
Recently in Nepal, for example, the state corporation that was planning a new
hydropower complex urged the people whose land and houses were to be expro-
priated to surrender them willingly and to accept modest levels of compensation
because the project was necessary for the ‘welfare of the nation’. (See the Feasi-
bility Study for Arun III Hydroelectric Project, Lahmeyer International Joint 
Venture, Kathmandu, Nepal, 1992.)
The Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) is the second largest water 
58 P. DEVITT & R.K. HITCHCOCK
transfer and hydroelectric project in Africa today, the largest being the Chinese-
built Meroe Dam on the fourth cataract of the Nile in Sudan. Costing an  estimated 
US$3 billion for the fi rst two phases (1A – The Katse Dam, and 1B – the Mohale
Dam), the project provides water from the Senqu River Basin in Lesotho, which
is part of the much larger Gariep (Orange) River Basin, for the Gauteng region
of South Africa (formerly Johannesburg and the Witwatersrand), and electricity
for Maseru, the capital of Lesotho.
The Kingdom of Lesotho (formerly, the Basutoland Protectorate, one of 3  British
Protectorates in southern Africa) gained independence on October 4, 1966. Land-
locked and completely surrounded by South Africa (see Fig. 1), Lesotho (Fig. 2
& 3) is one of the smallest countries in continental Africa. It is 30,355 sq km
in size, about the size of the American state of Maryland or the country of 
Belgium. It is also one of the poorest countries on the African continent, with a
third of the  population living on less than US$1 a day. In the 1990s, approxi-
mately 40% of the Gross National Product of Lesotho was made up of remit-
tances from Basotho mine labourers who worked in South Africa and a signifi -
cant portion of the economy was dependent on agriculture. In 2009, according
to the World  Factbook,  Lesotho had a population of 2,130,819 people. Largely
Fig. 1. Map of Lesotho.
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Fig. 3. A village and nearby fi elds above the Mohale Reservoir.
Fig. 2. A Mosotho woman selling fi sh caught in Katse reservoir.
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populated by a single  ethnic group, the Basotho, Lesotho also has members of a
number of other  ethnic groups, including Xhosa, Zulu, Tswana, Europeans, Indi-
ans, and  Chinese.
The LHWP contains two of the larger dams in Africa (for a list of some of 
the large dams in Africa and some of their impacts on human populations, see
Table 1). Co-fi nanced by the governments of Lesotho and South Africa, the Devel-
opment Bank of Southern Africa, the World Bank, the European Investment Bank,
a number of private banks, and Africa export credit-backed commercial loans, the
LHWP generated a substantial portion of the country’s budget, with benefi ts gen-
erated for the country as a whole and costs born  primarily by the people and 
habitats in the highlands (World Bank, 2007).
Over the past several decades or so the ethics of the occupation by the state
of farmers’ land, their villages, burial sites and other features of their landscape
‘in the cause of the greater good’ has received widespread attention, especially
with reference to the construction of large dams (Lawson, 1982; Wiest, 1995;
Dorcey et al., 1997; World Commission on Dams, 2000; McCully, 2001;  Khagram,
2004; Morvaridi, 2004; Scudder, 2005). For many years the most signifi cant player 
Table 1. Major Dams in Africa and Asia that have affected local communities
Name of Dam and Year(s) of 
Completion
River and Country Numbers of Households of 
 Individuals Displaced or Resettled
Akosombo Dam, 1965 Volta River, Ghana 84,000 people
Aswan Dam, 1902, 1912, 1934 Nile River, Egypt hundreds of Nubians and others
displaced
Aswan High Dam, 1970 Nile River, Egypt and Sudan 120,000 people (50,000 from
 reservoir)
Kainji Dam, 1968 Niger River, Nigeria 44,000 people
Kariba Dam, 1959 Zambezi River, Zambia and 
 Zimbabwe
57,000 people (34,000 from 
 reservoir, Zambia side)
Katse Dam, 1995 Malibamats’o River, Lesotho 71 households displaced, 2,700 ha
grazing and 925 ha of arable land 
lost, 20,000 people affected
Kiambere Dam, 1988 Tana River, Kenya 7,000 people
Maguga Dam, 2001 Nkomati River, Swaziland 66 households (ca. 480 people) 
displaced
Manantali Dam, 1988 Bafi ng River, Mali 11,000 people (9,535 from 
 reservoir)
Meroe Dam, 2008 4th Cataract of the Nile, Sudan 70,000 people displaced, some left 
in desert with no support or 
 facilities
Mohale Dam, 2007 Senqunyane River, Lesotho 325 households in Stages 1 and 2,
71 other households lost over 50% 
of their land; 1,125 ha of grazing 
land and 875 ha of arable land 
lost, 7,400 people affected
Roseires Dam, 1966 Blue Nile, Sudan 10,000 people displaced
Note: Data obtained from fi eldwork and from World Commission on Dams (2000); McCully (2001);
Scudder (2005) and the International Rivers Network, http://www.irn.org
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in the funding of large dams in the developing world was the World Bank (the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, IBRD). Often criticized 
for its role in support of large dams, the World Bank also played an important 
pioneering role in the development of social and environmental guidelines aimed 
at minimizing socioeconomic and environmental impacts (Scudder, 2005: 270–
285). The World Bank’s Guidelines on Involuntary Resettlement, which appeared 
originally in 1980 as “Social Issues Associated with Involuntary Resettlement in
Bank-Financed Projects” (World Bank, 1980), and then later as part of its
environmental policies in revised form (World Bank, 2004a), have become the
basis of an internationally accepted code of practice (World Bank, 2004b; Cernea
& McDowell, 2000; Scudder, 2005: 278–283). Virtually all proponents of big
dam projects have until recently used this basic code of practice in project prep-
aration. This to a large extent is because big dams usually require international
fi nancing, and the availability of funds from international agencies is dependent 
on compliance with these or similar criteria for involuntary resettlement. Over 
time, the operational policies of the World Bank regarding resettlement and 
environmental impact assessment were watered down, indicating an awareness by
the World Bank that the earlier, more stringent, policies were often diffi cult to
implement and too demanding on the limited resources of borrowers. Also, newly
industrialising nations such as China and Brazil were building dams in other 
countries independently of World Bank fi nance and guidelines.
It has become the normal practice for detailed plans to be made for the reset-
tlement, compensation and rehabilitation of communities and families affected by
dam projects (World Commission on Dams, 2000; Scudder, 2005; Cernea &
Mathur, 2008). However, when these and plans for the engineering and other 
aspects of the project have been approved by the funding agencies and fi nance
is committed, there is a strong tendency for work on land acquisition and 
construction to commence with alacrity, while implementation of the resettlement,
compensation and economic development programs becomes mired in bureaucratic
procedures, diffi culties in obtaining political approvals, and scarcity of able or 
willing people to get on with the job.
One common reason for this is that the engineering works are invariably
contracted out while the resettlement program is to be carried out in house, by
civil servants or staff of the agency implementing the project. The staff desig-
nated to perform these tasks are rarely experienced in this type of work, and few
are prepared to spend the required long periods in the fi eld with the affected 
communities. The proponent is usually a government department or parastatal
organization with an engineering remit and staffed largely by engineers, such as
an electricity or water corporation, or an irrigation authority.
Many such organizations now have their own ‘environmental divisions’,  normally
established at the behest of one of the international funding agencies. But the
environmental divisions of large engineering corporations tend to be dominated by
engineers and by the engineering priorities of the organization as a whole. They
often lack any real autonomy in the important realm of responsibility for making
and implementing decisions and are, in reality; the ‘poor relations’ within the
authority. Their most conspicuous and time-consuming occupations are the writing
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of reports and memos and attendance at meetings and conferences; few are  capable
of actually implementing a full program of resettlement and rehabilitation.
Prime requirements of the resettlement implementation agency are fl exibility,
responsiveness, creativity, and compassion for those who can do little to help
themselves in the face of the overwhelming changes imposed on them. While
many individuals are endowed with these qualities, they are generally not char-
acteristic of large offi cial agencies, especially if they are charged with heavy
engineering responsibilities and tight schedules.
The responsibility for a politically sensitive social program such as resettlement 
therefore sits uncomfortably in a government or a parastatal institution, and yet 
there is usually a powerful reluctance to contract that work out to a  professionally
competent body in the same way that the engineering works are given out on
contract. Indeed, there are few independent professional bodies with practical
experience of this kind of work. There are many who have prepared resettlement 
plans, but few who have actually implemented them. Nevertheless, there are good 
reasons for governments to be strongly engaged in resettlement programs for they
are ultimately responsible for the outcome, or at least will be held responsible.
The civil service, whatever its weaknesses, is the most durable of national insti-
tutions and where investments are to be made in capacity building it makes sense
to do it here.
The physical resettlement program is the easy part, and one which is familiar 
to an engineering – oriented organisation, as it consists largely of construction
works – roads, water supply and other services, building houses, transport of mate-
rials and people, etc. The restitution of livelihoods, social structures, and a sense
of belonging in the new place is, however, a venture fraught with uncertainty.
Even specialists with long experience in this fi eld expect and invariably fi nd innu-
merable problems and set-backs, especially in the rehabilitation of the weakest 
and most vulnerable people.
As a result of these factors the involuntary resettlement of established rural
populations to make way for a big dam is usually disastrous for at least some
of the people concerned, hardly less painful and disruptive than war or fl ood.
Attempts to soften the blow of forced removals by resettling whole communities,
with a view to providing mutual support in re-establishing the normal activities
and relationships of the rural families, have seldom worked. Resettlement is  usually
the occasion for a dispersal of traditionally cohesive communities. The very poor,
the elderly, and the disadvantaged often cannot or do not wish to make a new
life in the place designated by the planners for them.
The strong, the wealthy, and the enterprising may actually welcome the
opportunity provided by compensation payments and resettlement entitlements to
move out of an economic backwater and seek their fortunes elsewhere, free of 
the encumbrance of dependent relatives. Some may remain in the resettlement 
areas designated for them if the economic opportunities are suffi ciently attractive,
or even at the dam site itself if they can fi nd work on the construction contracts,
but equally they may take their chance to improve their lot by moving to a city.
Even this positive outcome may have its darker side, as neighbours and kin who
cannot follow them are deprived of their energy, ideas, and enterprise.
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The idea that a resettlement program can be undertaken as a development 
 program has become a part of the standard phraseology of project preparation,
but to what extent does it refl ect the actual intentions and actions of the author-
ities, and can the re-settlers themselves use the opportunities provided by com-
pensation and other entitlements to improve their own lives?
The responsible authority in Lesotho set out with the declared intention to
conduct a model resettlement program, learning from the experience of its own
and others’ actions. When detailed planning for the resettlement and  rehabilitation
of residents in the Mohale dam basin began, the project authority had just com-
pleted construction of the fi rst dam of the LHWP, at Katse, some 50 km from
Mohale in the mountains (for a discussion of some of the lessons learned from
Phase 1A of the LHWP, see Maema et al., 1997). The Katse experience, it was
generally acknowledged, was one that had its limitations and therefore was not 
to be repeated at Mohale.
In spite of a massive commitment of funds, expertise and other resources, over 
a period of a dozen years to date, the outcome of the resettlement program for 
the Mohale Dam has been a mixture of success in some respects and failure in
others. In some crucial respects the outcome is unknown and will probably never 
be known except by those whose lives were most directly affected.
In accordance with current norms for involuntary resettlement there was an
explicit commitment by the authority to engage the affected communities in the
planning and implementation of their own removal and re-establishment in new
places of their choice. Elaborate arrangements were made and new institutions
were set up to facilitate this participative operation. They certainly enabled the
affected people to participate, and the authority to interact with them, but at 
several important points the differences in outlook and approach between offi cials
and locals proved unbridgeable; as a result, there was a standoff and mutual
mistrust arose.
This paper aims to illustrate, by means of the Mohale Dam case study, how a
resettlement, compensation and rehabilitation program, which was to have been
carried out ‘by the book’ (the ‘book’ at that time being the World Bank’s opera-
tional directives(1)) actually fared. The responses of the offi cials in the project 
authority and of the affected communities to one another, and of both to the
 project itself, are described in some detail. These interactions took place in a
context of mutual expectations, conditioned by the prevailing social and political
norms, the changing forms of land tenure in Lesotho and the World Bank’s
requirements for the active participation of the people in the design and imple-
mentation of their own compensation and resettlement program.
The paper also describes the events which led to the affected communities
themselves taking the lead in preparing for their own resettlement, urging the
authorities which had imposed this necessity upon them to act promptly in  support 
of their plans. The response of the authorities to these demands, and the conse-
quent necessity to make decisions and take responsibility for its own actions
varied. At certain times it would respond directly and sensitively; at others it 
would freeze in a posture of immobility and alarm, allowing only those opera-
tions to proceed which would avoid the actual obstruction of the contractors’
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access to the work site, which would have resulted in the contractors claiming
heavy damages against the project authority.
The paper begins with a description of the LHWP. It goes on to describe the ways
in which the people affected by the project were consulted and how they took part 
in the relocation and resettlement process. It concludes with a consideration of some
of the direct and indirect impacts of the Mohale Dam on the people of the highlands,
those people who were relocated or resettled because of the project, and their hosts
in the villages and towns to which people from Mohale moved.
THE LESOTHO HIGHLANDS WATER PROJECT (LHWP)
The LHWP, as conceived originally, involved the construction of fi ve large
dams, all in Lesotho. It also consisted of transfer tunnels, roads, and facilities for 
power generation and distribution. The fi rst large dam built, Katse Dam (part of 
LHWP Phase 1A) on the Malibamats’o River, is the highest dam in Africa (180
meters in height). It was completed in 1995 and dedicated in 1996. The second 
large dam, the subject of this paper, Mohale Dam, part of Phase 1B, is located 
on the Senqunyane River (See Fig. 4). The Mohale Dam is the largest rock-fi lled 
Fig. 4. Map of Lesotho showing the LHWP Phase 1A and Phase 1B Scheme Areas.
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embankment dam on the African continent, 144 meters in height. It was begun
in 1998 and completed in 2004. Tunnels enable the transfer of water between the
dams and from the Katse Dam through the Maluti Mountains to other parts of 
the country and to South Africa. One of these, the Trans-Caledon Tunnel, pro-
vides water from Lesotho northwards to the Ash River in South Africa and from
there to Gauteng, the industrial heartland of South Africa.
Lesotho traditionally has been divided into 4 physical zones – the mountains,
or Maluti; the foothills; the lowlands, and the Senqu River Valley (Bawden &
Carroll, 1968). These are signifi cantly different agro-climatic regions. The Maluti
(Maloti) Mountains of Lesotho, the so-called highlands, make up a signifi cant 
portion of the country, some 61%, averaging between 2,100 and 3,000 meters in
elevation. The Malutis can be seen as ‘water towers’ out of which  rivers fl ow to
the foothills and lowlands. The foothills, which lie at elevations ranging from
1,800 and 2,200 meters, make up 15% of the land area. The  lowlands, averag-
ing between 1,500 and 1,800 meters in elevation, comprise about a fi fth of the
country (20%) and are found primarily in the western and northern regions of 
Lesotho. The Senqu River Valley makes up 4% of the total area of Lesotho (Chakela,
1999). Arable land is found primarily in the foothills and lowlands as well as in
the deep mountain valleys. Cattle, horses, donkeys, and small stock (sheep and 
goats) are raised in various parts of the country, with the mountains serving as
summer grazing areas for herds from the lowlands and foothills.
The direct impact of the LHWP falls on the environment and the people of 
the mountains, where the dams and their reservoirs are. Some of the displaced 
people have remained in the mountains, concentrating on livestock production,
while others have moved to the foothills to take advantage of the agricultural
possibilities, or to the lowlands, where Maseru the capital city of Lesotho is
situated, to fi nd jobs or commercial opportunities. In both of these areas, host 
populations (the residents of the foothills and lowlands) have had mixed responses
to their new neighbours, in some cases welcoming them and in other cases  treating
them with a certain amount of suspicion, in part because of fear of competition
for jobs and scarce resources.
The Phase 1A Katse Dam displaced 71 families, most of whom moved upslope
and remained in the vicinity. In the terminology of the LHWP, they were ‘ relocated’.
The term ‘resettlement’ was applied by the Lesotho Highlands Development 
Authority (LHDA) to families moving out of the area to establish themselves
elsewhere. The affected families in Phase 1A were not given the option to ‘ resettle’
elsewhere with project support and compensation. If they chose to do so, they
were ‘on their own’. The relocated families were compensated for their land losses
with annual deliveries of grain, equivalent to the crop they would have had from
their inundated land. These deliveries were planned to continue for 15 years,
after which time recipients were expected to have found new income-earning
opportunities through LHDA’s rural development program which was charged with
the promotion of agricultural, pastoral and other income-generating enterprises.
This program, however, achieved very little. In 1995, as in previous years, it was
able to spend only some 3% of its annual budget due to an acute lack of 
implementation capacity and perhaps to a shortage of commitment on the part of 
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the LHDA.
In the 1990s there was mounting dissatisfaction among affected families both
with the compensation package and with the rural development program in Katse.
Several major problems confronted the relocated families: most of their best land 
and natural resources had been inundated, there were few new and permanent 
jobs and other economic opportunities in the area. The rural development  program
had not yielded signifi cant practical benefi ts, and they were not enabled to move
away in search of better opportunities.
New houses were built for the displaced families by LHDA according to a set 
of standard designs. Although LHDA had almost a decade in which to prepare
for resettlement a few months before Katse Dam was to be closed in October,
1995 and the water would begin to rise no new houses had been built and no
one had been relocated. A crash program was instituted and contracts for the new
houses were hastily let. Some houses were to be built in places without roads,
where the cost of building to modern specifi cations, in a hurry, was very high.
Some of the houses, which replaced traditional circular huts with stone walls and 
thatched roofs, cost as much to build as the current price of a large modern house
in one of the opulent suburbs of Johannesburg/Gauteng. The new houses were,
however, generally well received by their occupants and went some way to  offset 
their complaints about LHDA’s attempts to revive their damaged economy.
THE MOHALE BASIN
The Mohale Basin is the term applied to the area most directly affected by the
Mohale Dam and its reservoir. It includes the dam itself, the area inundated at full
supply level, and the slopes of the Sequnyane Valley in the vicinity of the  reservoir 
where the affected residents grazed their livestock. The catchment of the Mohale
Basin (see Fig. 5) is 938 sq km in size (www.lhwp.org.ls/overview.html). Most of 
the Mohale Basin, and especially its most densely settled part, were inaccessible
by road until recently when the transfer tunnel access road was built. All human
movement in and out of the area was by foot or by donkey and horse. This seclu-
sion, and the fertile soils of an oxbow, encouraged a degree of food self-suffi ciency
unusual in Lesotho. It was also conducive to the production of marijuana (Canna-
bis sativa). This is an illegal crop in Lesotho, and it can only be grown in any
quantity where the police cannot reach. In the old days the police patrolled rural
areas on horseback, and as a result the marijuana growers of Mohale were largely
left in peace. They sold their crop to South African traders who came to buy and 
take it away on donkeys over the mountains.
Other sources of cash income were livestock sales and for many decades, work 
on the South African gold mines. It was the norm for young men to leave their 
villages and work in the mines until middle or late middle age (Murray, 1981;
Lye & Murray, 1980; World Bank, 1994; Sechaba Consultants, 2000; Turner,
2000). For some years prior to the decision to build the Mohale Dam the mines
had, however, been employing fewer and fewer Basotho, which had a profound 
effect on income of most Lesotho families and on the life prospects of working-
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age men. There were very few employment opportunities in the vicinity of Mohale
until the start of construction on the dam, and these jobs were by nature only
temporary. Moreover, the contractors brought most of their skilled men with them,
and only relatively menial jobs were available for locals.
Prior to inundation the economy of the Mohale Basin was adequate to sustain
its inhabitants in a modest traditional style. There were few signs of conspicuous
wealth, but equally few of poverty. In this regard the people were signifi cantly
better off than most rural Basotho, whose fi elds produced a poor and unreliable
supply of food and little surplus for sale.(2)
The Mohale Dam will likely have displaced some 320 households (and possi-
bly as many as 425) when the removals are complete. The Mohale Dam is con-
nected to Katse Dam by a 30 km tunnel. The several arms of the reservoir extend 
for long distances up the main and tributary valleys, creating peninsulas whose
occupants would be caught between the reservoir and high mountain peaks.
The site of Mohale Dam and its reservoir, which reached full supply level in
February, 2006, lies at an altitude of some 2500 m, with surrounding slopes and 
peaks reaching up to 3500 m. At this height winters are severe and snow is
common in winter and not unknown in summer. The climate limits the range of 
crops that can be grown and their yields, and the fi elds are sited mainly in the
valleys and on the more sheltered slopes. Most of the valleys are steeply incised 
and offer little level ground suitable for cultivation, while the soil on slopes is
generally thin and stony. These conditions make the Mohale area suited predom-
inantly to livestock, with agriculture confi ned mainly to small and isolated patches.
The Mohale Dam was designed to inundate a large and ancient oxbow, which
included 760 hectares of deep and fertile soils, a rare and valuable resource in the
Fig. 5. Map of the Mohale Dam Area in Lesotho showing the areas where project-affected people
could relocate.
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mountains. It was mainly the agricultural possibilities that had attracted a  relatively
large population – for the mountains – to settle in this area. Unfortunately for the
villagers the same oxbow provided valuable storage for the planned reservoir.
The LHWP provides for compensation, resettlement, and development initia-
tives aimed at ensuring that project-affected people will be enabled to maintain
a standard of living not inferior to that obtaining at the time of fi rst disturbance
(LHWP Treaty, Article 7, paragraph 18) (Government of Lesotho and Govern-
ment of South Africa, 1986). The LHWP also provided for environmental reha-
bilitation, natural resources management and conservation. There were efforts
made to conserve endangered species such as the Maluti minnow (Pseudobarbus
quathlambae), the bearded vulture (lammergeier, Gypaetus barbarus), and the
spiral aloe (Aloe polyphylla). It should be noted that as of the time of writing,
there were serious questions as to whether the Maluti minnow would become
extinct as a result of the LHWP, in part because of lack of concerted action on
the part of the LHDA. Some new protected areas were established, including a
new national park, Ts’ehlenyane, in the ‘Muela area and a nature reserve at 
Bokong, a scenic overlook area near an alpine wetland at the top of the Mafi ka
Lisiu Pass between Pitseng and Ha Lejone on the way from Maseru to the Katse
Dam. There was also a small heritage park established at Liphofung, a 4.5 ha
cultural site where there is a small cultural museum that is associated with a
Community Conservation Forum. This site consists of a historically and archaeo-
logically important rock shelter with contemporary ethnoarchaeological materials,
including the remains of facilities used for livestock keeping by local herders.
The LHWP affected numerous rock art sites, a number of which were preserved.
Many of the rock art sites are likely the work of San (Bushmen) who resided in
the mountains for thousands of years. There are few, if any, people who claim
San descent in the mountains today, but there are numerous archaeological and 
historical sites that were occupied by San peoples who interacted in a variety of 
ways with Basotho, Europeans, and other groups in the Lesotho area in the past 
(Wright, 1971; Taole Tesele, personal communication, 2007). The preservation
and management of Lesotho’s rich cultural heritage and diversity were seen as
important objectives of the LHWP.
LHWP PROJECT MANAGEMENT
During the World Bank funded and supervised feasibility study of the LHWP 
in 1986 it was recognized that the very large scale of the operation, involving a
series of dams and tunnels in the Maluti Mountains, and the resulting disruption
to local communities and their resources, required a new and dedicated organiza-
tion to implement and manage it. The project far exceeded the capacity of any
existing government agency, and it needed a degree of fi nancial and administra-
tive freedom which would have been impossible from within the civil service.
Thus the LHDA was established, and with offers of better salaries and working
conditions it immediately attracted many of the more capable civil servants. A 
large and generously funded Environment Division was established within LHDA,
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with responsibility for compensation and resettlement, rural development, envi-
ronmental protection and public health.
The management of the LHWP was overseen by the Joint Permanent  Technical
Commission, later called the Lesotho Highlands Water Commission (LHWC).
Project implementation in Lesotho was handled by the LHDA and for South
Africa by the Trans-Caledon Tunnel Authority. Requests for budget approvals for 
engineering, environment, and social services activities went to the LHWC. The
Commission was made up of three delegates each from Lesotho and South Africa,
with 3 alternates on each side. The Chief Delegate of the Commission was from
Lesotho. In terms of governmental management of the LHWP, the Ministry of 
Natural Resources in Lesotho and the Ministry of Water Affairs and Forestry in
South Africa were the responsible agencies.
Planning for the resettlement of several hundred families in the remote Sen-
quyane Valley began in 1995. The Mohale Dam would inundate their villages,
the graveyards of their ancestors, their fi elds and grazing grounds. A few  families
would be able to ‘relocate’, rather than ‘resettle’, by moving a short distance
upslope to rejoin villages they had left some years before. For these families,
economic and social dislocation would be tempered by their remaining in a  familiar 
environment, albeit one radically altered and curtailed by the reservoir, along with
their relatives and neighbours. But in some of these communities the decision,
taken some decades ago, to move away from the parent village was made because
of strains and tensions between families and sections of the community, and time
has not entirely erased the ill-feeling. For most families, however, ‘resettlement’
to a destination far from their present homes was the only option. Whole villages
would be fl ooded and there would be no place where they could rebuild locally
and still hope to make a living out of agriculture and stock-keeping, the  mainstays
of their economy.
Following adoption of the feasibility study by the Lesotho and South African
Governments and by the World Bank as principal international funding agency, the
project went into fi nal design. During this period the LHDA appointed and the
Bank funded a compensation advisor to help draw up a compensation policy which
refl ected the experience gained during the construction of the Project’s fi rst major 
dam at Katse, and which incorporated the current international norms for resettle-
ment (all of which were reiterations, in various forms, of World Bank  policy).
The detailed planning of the resettlement program, and for the development of 
project affected areas, was contracted out to consultants, who worked from late
1995 to the end of 1996 (see Hunting-Consult 4 Joint Venture, 1997a–d). Field 
work began with comprehensive land use, land capability and soil surveys of the
project area. A cadastral survey was undertaken of the structures and land directly
affected by inundation or construction, and also of the land remaining to the
affected families. From this it was possible to gauge how seriously the project 
would affect each family and whether it would still be possible to make a living
from the remaining land after impoundment of the reservoir.
An infrastructure engineer travelled widely on foot and horseback through the
area to consider with the residents the need for roads and bridges to alleviate
some of the present and future communication problems, and also to plan village
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water supplies, schools and the most acceptable methods of rebuilding houses at 
the chosen resettlement destinations.
One of the project’s two anthropologists and his wife went to stay in one of 
the villages to be inundated, while the other set about establishing the means for 
the affected people to participate fully in the planning and implementation of 
their own resettlement and development program. Throughout the planning period 
the consultants worked closely with LHDA, who were to implement the agreed 
program, and with the World Bank’s Panel of Environmental Experts, who made
periodic visits. Table 2 presents milestones in the planning and construction of 
Mohale Dam. The authors of this paper have been associated with the LHWP 
throughout its existence, from the 1986 Feasibility Study to the present day. Devitt 
carried out the Environmental Impact Assessment in 1986 and was later the
Compensation Advisor to the LHDA and the fi eld anthropologist with the 1996
Resettlement and Development Study. Hitchcock has been a member of the World 
Bank’s Panel of Environmental Experts since its inception in 1990. His most 
recent visit to Lesotho was in March, 2010.
Table 2. Milestones in the planning and construction of the Mohale Dam
Year(s) Milestones
1985 Feasibility Study for the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) begins
1986 Lesotho Highlands Development Authority (LHDA) established with the signing of the
LHWP Treaty and Order
1987–1996 Implementation of advanced infrastructure (roads, electricity) and construction of dams
and tunnels in Katse and ‘Muela areas (Phase 1A of the LHWP)
1995–1996 Feasibility studies and resettlement planning for Phase 1B of the LHWP begin
1996 Completion of Katse Dam, the largest dam in Phase 1A of the LHWP
1996–1998 Phase 1B Stage 1 resettlement and relocation implemented
1997 Reservoir-Induced Seismicity sees earthquakes having impacts on 7 villages in the Katse
catchment; in one village, Mapaleng, 11 houses were destroyed, resulting in  displacement 
of a dozen families (January)
1997 Adoption of revised compensation and rehabilitation policy based on the LHWP Phase
1A experience
1998 Construction of Mohale Dam (Phase 1B) begins
2002–2006 Phase 1B Stage 2 resettlement and relocation implemented
2003 Completion of Mohale Dam construction
2004 Offi cial inauguration of Phase 1 of LHWP (March 16)
2006 Crack appears in wall of Mohale Dam (February), completion of relocation of  households
affected by the reservoir
2007 LHWP Implementation Completion Report (ICR) by World Bank
2008 Decisions reached by LHDA and LHWC on Stage 3 resettlement
2009 Decision made to implement Phase 2 of the LHWP (February)
2009 Final visit of Panel of Environmental Experts on Phase 1 of the LHWP (September– 
October), crack in Mohale Dam repaired (October)
2010 Workshop on lessons learned from LHWP (May 18)
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COMPENSATION AND REHABILITATION POLICY
The international norms for compensating and rehabilitating people affected by
big dams set high ethical standards, and demand a sequence of intelligence-
gathering and fi eld actions worthy of a military campaign. But like several
recent military operations, the outcome of even the most meticulously planned 
resettlement program is unpredictable and hardly ever an unmitigated success.
Two principles are central to all but a very few internationally fi nanced reset-
tlement programs: that the affected people should in large measure be the archi-
tects and the builders of their own futures; and that none who are compelled to
move should end up worse off than before. In practice, however, these ideals are
all but unattainable, even where the numbers of people affected are small, the
money and expertise are adequate and the responsible authorities are sympathetic.
These same authorities are subject to political, economic and ideological pres-
sures which drive them on an unpredictable and uncharted path.
These principles were fully incorporated into LHDA’s 1997 revision of its
compensation and rehabilitation policy. The revision was carried out in prepara-
tion for Phase 1B of the Project – the Mohale Dam – and was based on current 
international norms and on LHDA’s own experience of Phase 1A of the Project – 
the Katse Dam, the ‘Muela Dam, and the ‘Muela Hydropower Station.
One of LHDA’s legal obligations is to ensure that the LHDA “shall effect all
measures to ensure that members of local communities who will be affected by
fl ooding, construction works, or other similar Project-related causes, will be able
to maintain a standard of living not inferior to that obtaining at the time of fi rst 
disturbance.”(3) The LHDA Order of 1986 (Government of Lesotho and Govern-
ment of South Africa, 1986: 3) states that the LHDA shall “ensure that as far as
reasonably possible, the standard of living and the income of persons displaced 
by the construction of an approved scheme shall not be reduced from the  standard 
of living and the income existing prior to the displacement of such persons.”
The compensation package of 1997 consisted of the following:
(1)  replacement of homes and other facilities (e.g. kraals – livestock pens – 
and latrines). LHDA built new homes, according to a set of standard designs,
at sites chosen by the families. There was also provision for families to
take the cash equivalent and build their own new homes;
(2)  compensation for loss of arable land. Households moving out of the high-
lands gave up their rights to the property and arable land for which they
received compensation. They had the option of choosing annual cash com-
pensation, compensation in the form of grain, or lump sum compensation
for the losses of agricultural fi elds(4) (calculated on the basis of estimates
of their productivity). Annual payments were to be made for 50 years;(5)
(3)  compensation for communal resources, including grazing, shrubs (used for 
fi rewood, construction, or manufacturing of goods), thatching grass, and 
medicinal plants. This compensation came in the form of the Rural Devel-
opment Program (RDP), explained in some detail below;
(4)  replacement of community assets lost such as schools or churches;
(5)  relocation of graves and the holding of ceremonies at or around the time
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of re-interment;
(6)  cash payment for garden lands, which are generally are under 400 square
meters, and usually close to households, where fruit and vegetables are
grown.
(7)  a Disturbance Allowance paid to households for three years after relocation
or resettlement.
In addition, there was to be a Minimum Threshold Payment for each project-
affected household whose minimum income fell below an estimated poverty level
of 3,960 Maluti. One Maluti, pegged to the South African Rand, was worth about 
US$0.16 in September, 2006. (M7,558.80 at 2005 rates). It was to be provided 
in the form of cash as a top-up payment to ensure that each affected household 
remained above the threshold level, and it is to be paid annually for 10 years
from the time of relocation or resettlement. When annual income exceeds the
threshold level the payment is withdrawn.
The 1997 Compensation Policy provides for annual assessments of project-
affected households’ livelihoods. In fact, the annual assessments have not taken
place. Various partial studies have tried to establish income and expenditure
levels of the resettled families, but these are acknowledged to provide incom-
plete data and are of dubious accuracy. Verifi able income and expenditure data
are notoriously hard to collect and in this case there was known to be a bias
due to the tendency of respondents to under-report income and infl ate costs in
the hope of qualifying for higher rates of compensation and of Minimum
Threshold Payments.
Communal compensation in the form of the RDP (as in (3) above), for losses
of grazing and other natural resources was provided to project-affected xcommu-
nities and their hosts. To participate in the RDP people were required to form
co-operatives, grazing associations or other kinds of local legal entities. The co-
operatives helped their members to purchase agricultural inputs and to market 
their products, including seed potatoes and maize; the grazing associations were
intended to improve the management of the communal range; grain mills  provided 
a service where none was previously available; other components included  tourism,
fi sheries, health, water and sanitation and youth development.
While the individual compensation and threshold payments were intended to
ensure that affected families were at least no worse off after than before
resettlement, the ‘communal compensation’ was meant to bring ‘development’ and 
improved standards of living both to the affected families and to their hosts.
Infrastructure was provided in the relocation and resettlement areas, including
new roads and community watering points. Funds were also made available as
replacement for gardens. LHDA also provided gardens for resettled households
through the use of heavy equipment at LHDA expense.
The experience of the Katse (Phase 1A) rural development program had been
a caution against the assumption that this form of communal compensation can
bring tangible benefi ts to the participants. That program had been well funded,
but in many years it was unable to spend more than a few percent of its budget,
and that which had been spent was generally ineffectual in bringing about any
signifi cant improvements. Part of the reason that so little was spent was that 
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 priority shifted to Phase 1B developments. Another reason for the expenditure
patterns was that there were insuffi cient personnel, especially in agriculture and 
income generation projects, to implement programs. It should be noted, however,
that the record of Phase 1A fi eld personnel in the establishment of community
co-operatives was far better than it was in Phase 1B, so more funds were expended 
in setting up and running community-based projects such as hammer mills,  sewing
projects, and petrol stations.
The 1995/1996 Phase 1B Resettlement and Development Study, which formed 
the basis of the subsequent resettlement and development program, had stressed 
that participation in the development program should not be taken as a form of 
individual compensation for economic losses sustained on account of the project.
Some LHDA offi cials nevertheless took the view that although some of the affected 
families seemed to be falling into poverty they would nevertheless benefi t from
the development program and would ultimately be better off. The evidence from
Katse that this assumption was unsound was met by the argument ‘now we know
how to do it better’. This too proved false, with the exception of two projects,
one for growing seed potatoes and the other for improved maize production and 
marketing.
A major study by the South African Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC)
was completed in 2007 and the fi nal report made available in July, 2009 (HSRC,
2007a–d, 2009). Some of the issues highlighted in this report were the impacts
of the project on the well-being of the people affected directly and indirectly by
the LHWP, the roles that compensation played in helping to restore the incomes
of people affected by the project, and the effects of the project in terms of health
and nutrition. For example, there was a relatively high rate of HIV/AIDS and 
other sexually transmitted infections in the Katse, Lejone, and Mohale areas and 
some of the project-affected households exhibited evidence of under-nutrition. A 
general conclusion of the HSRC study was that compensation had largely enabled 
project-affected people to maintain their living standards. The HSRC study did 
not, however, address some of the temporal trends affecting local populations and 
the degree to which dependency on the LHDA had a  debilitating effect on some
of the people who were affected by the fi rst phase of the LHWP, in part because
of the lack of comparable data from the various studies that had been conducted 
as part of the project (HSRC, 2009: 9).
The HSRC examined issues surrounding participation, drawing on group inter-
views of people in the project area. Some of the local people said that they were
aware that the LHDA had a set of policies and procedures relating to participa-
tion (see LHDA, 1997a–c). A sizable number of the people who spoke about the
project to the HSRC researchers said that they believed that it was important for 
them to have a say about the project and the way that it was implemented, but 
that they were unsure whether the project authorities were really listening to their 
concerns. One of the biggest concerns that people had related to whether or not they
would receive fair compensation for the assets that they lost to the LHWP.
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COMPENSATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN PHASE 1B OF THE LHWP
By the time the compensation policy of 1997 came to be applied, the dialogue
between LHDA, the affected families, the Panel of Experts and others had taken
the policy several steps further and by 1998 the Phase 1B amended  compensation
policy incorporated the following changes:
1.  The Scope of Services for each new construction contract shall show in
detail how the contractors intend to address environmental and social impacts
associated with the contract and how they will reinstate any surface works
for the benefi t and in accordance with the wishes of the local community.
2.  LHDA shall manage land taken for project purposes in a benefi cial manner 
and then return leftover land to its previous users, and land not being used 
shall be made available for re-allocation.
3.  Replacement income, in the form of Minimum Threshold Payments, shall
be periodically adjusted to ensure that the standard of living of each affected 
family is maintained.
4.  LHDA shall compile baseline information on households affected by the
project.
5.  Equitable compensation shall be provided for people who hold ‘secondary
rights’ (i.e. people having sharecropping, rental, or borrowing arrangements
with land holders).
6.  People who received compensation for loss of assets would also gain access
to development assistance, training and credit.
7.  The Phase 1B compensation policy added an annuity option (that is, people
could choose a lump sum cash payment for their losses, which would be
invested to yield an income).
8.  LHDA should investigate the scale and severity of losses of trees and natu-
ral sources of fuel and recommend a means of compensating people affected 
by these losses. The communal losses of grazing, trees, shrubs, and other 
resources would be included in a communal assets compensation program
that would be provided to affected communities as a whole.
9.  A dispute resolution system will be established in which people have the option
of appealing compensation decisions through the local level liaison committee,
the Land Tribunal, the High Court of Lesotho, and the Appeal Court.
In Phase 1A (The Katse Dam), compensation for losses of agricultural yields
was given in the form of annual supplies of grain and legumes (peas and beans).
In Phase 1B (The Mohale Dam) of the project, people could opt for  compensation
in the form of grain or cash. Most (95%) project-affected households in Mohale
opted for annual or lump sum cash payments. After the family’s basic domestic
needs had been met the balance of the lump sum cash payments could then be
reinvested in business ventures, the purchase of tools, seeds, and household goods,
or placed in interest-bearing unit trust accounts, as in 7 above.
‘Land-for-land’ has generally been considered the most satisfactory means of 
compensating for land losses in dam projects. Lesotho, being a small and moun-
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tainous country, its arable areas heavily populated and most of the land already
allocated to farmers land. Land-for-land did not therefore seem a feasible means
of providing compensation for lost arable fi elds, and for this reason various forms
of cash or grain compensation had been devised.
There are drawbacks to cash compensation. The global experience in resettle-
ment and compensation programs is that the provision of lump sum cash pay-
ments to rural families has not usually served to restore their incomes (Scudder,
2005: 82–86, 129–134; Cernea & Mathur, 2008). One of the reasons is that 
recipients who are unused to handling substantial sums of money may spend it 
very quickly and sometimes not very wisely. Another reason is the frequent lack 
of local opportunities for investment of the money. A third problem relates to the
control of the cash. In some cases, adult males in the household appropriate the
cash for their own use; women and children thus end up being disadvantaged.
An annuity system is an attractive alternative because it allows the initial invest-
ment to be safeguarded(6) and the income can be managed with relative ease. It 
can also be entered in the name of the individuals who then can control the cash
in the annuity. An annuity system has the advantage of being able to accommo-
date the various sources of individual and community income. It also allows
 people the fl exibility to save their money, divide it among designated kin or other 
people, or pool their funds for use in community projects. A nest-egg plan can
allow for the banking of funds indefi nitely. Individuals could choose to invest a
portion of their annuities in a special-purpose activity such as a revolving credit 
fund. Revolving credit schemes have worked well in a number of developing
countries, notably in the case of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and revolving
credit schemes in Uganda, and they have served as a means of providing people
with the capital necessary to initiate businesses and both on-farm and off-farm
income generating activities (Tendler, 1997).
There was nevertheless a strong feeling among senior LHDA offi cials during
the planning period that the compensation package should not encourage ‘ idleness’
by providing affected families with unearned income. The prospect of  hard-working
farmers being compensated for the loss of their land by means of a regular  stipend 
seemed to do just that. During the period when compensation policy was being
formulated an advisor proposed that people losing their land and buildings to the
project should be treated as investors in the project, the value of their shares
being proportional to the productive value of the land and other assets they
‘invested’ in the project. Since there were few opportunities for  land-for-land 
compensation, and the LHWP generates income through the sale of water to South
Africa, the shareholders would each receive a proportion of that income.
The concept of shareholding was virtually unknown in Lesotho at the time and 
the idea was swiftly dismissed, as an inducement to indigence. There was also a
sense that the creation of a partnership between the Lesotho Government and the
affected people would erode the primacy of the State in national affairs. The
Highlands Water Project was eminently a national undertaking and the inclusion
of locals as shareholders would weaken central control over it. Payment of the
cash equivalent of the annual crop value forgone, for fi fty years, was for reasons
unclear then as now, not regarded as indigence-inducing.
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Only recently has a signifi cant proportion of arable land, especially in the
lowlands and foothills, remained uncultivated from year to year. Although still
held under traditional and secure rights by those to whom it was allocated by
the local authorities or handed down by forebears,(7) large tracts have been lying
fallow from year to year. Agriculture has become an increasingly unrewarding
and expensive occupation. Soil fertility and rainfall are believed to have declined;
the cost of ploughing, for the many that do not have their own oxen, has increased;
and the cost of seed and fertiliser often exceeds the value of the crop. Arable
farming is a more viable enterprise when high-value cash crops can be raised 
and marketed, and the scope for that is limited.
The fact that arable land was going out of production, and was therefore not 
contributing to the holders’ income, may have provided an incentive for them to
realise some value from these otherwise useless fi elds. Those with traditional
rights over land began to lease it out, sharecrop it or even sell it. This opened 
the possibility for the Phase 1B settlers to negotiate for land to cultivate in
sharecropping kinds of arrangements or through rental.
There was a long and heated debate within LHDA and with the South African
negotiators as well as with the World Bank and the Panel of Environmental
Experts on the question of compensation for the loss of one of the pillars of the
local economy in the affected region. This was the production of marijuana, which
grew exceptionally well in the sheltered valleys soon to be occupied by the waters
of the Mohale Reservoir. As noted previously, growing marijuana is illegal in
Lesotho and in South Africa, but the remoteness of the area and the absence of 
roads prevented access by the police, and farmers raised their crop without 
hindrance. There was an established trade with South African marijuana dealers
who conveyed their purchases out of the area on donkeys. In the foothills and 
lowlands, where most of displaced people were going to settle, the police pres-
ence was too strong to allow this lucrative crop to be produced in commercial
quantities. Both governments took the view that they could not be party to a
scheme which compensated farmers for growing an illegal crop. Yet both sides
were legally bound to provide full compensation for economic losses caused by
the project. A way around this dilemma was found by assuming for  compensation
purposes that the area under marijuana was actually under maize, with unusually
high yields and prices.
Compensation policy was infl uenced by the outspoken dissatisfaction of the
affected families. They demanded a more effective compensation complaints mech-
anism than that provided by LHDA itself (see 9 above), and LHDA responded 
by attempting to deal with compensation complaints through its Field Operations
Branches, one of which was in Mohale. When compensation complaints did not 
bring about results that were satisfactory to those who felt aggrieved about losses
that they had suffered, they took the complaints to the government of Lesotho
and to the government Ombudsman or, in some cases, to non-government orga-
nizations (NGOs). The  Ombudsman responded by holding hearings on complaints
in Mohale and in the foothills (for example, at Nazareth). The result of these
hearings was a report by the  Ombudsman, published in August, 2003, which out-
lined the various complaints (Offi ce of the Ombudsman, 2003). LHDA responded 
77Who Drives Resettlement?
by increasing its efforts to resolve complaints ranging from repairing cracks in
houses caused by blasting to providing compensation to owners of agricultural
fi elds that had been damaged by boulders and debris resulting from road work.
Having little faith in the RDP as a means of  improving their livelihoods, the
affected families also urged that the 15 year compensation period for land losses
(see 2 above), be extended. LHDA and the Joint  Permanent Technical  Commission
responded by extending the compensation period for land losses to 50 years.
It was recognised that dislocation of the Mohale communities was likely to
have particularly adverse consequences for people with little or no land, for the
old and dependent, for sick and disabled people, and even for young people with
no land rights. For them compensation for the loss of assets and of production
could be quite inadequate to prevent their falling into poverty. The provision for 
compensating the holders of ‘secondary rights’ (see 5 above) and the Minimum
Threshold Payment were designed to prevent this. Despite the diffi culties of 
implementing these policies, they were sincere attempts by the Project to avoid 
harming the weak and the vulnerable.
The families affected by the Katse Dam and reservoir in Phase 1A, by most 
reports, had been poorly represented in the decisions that involved them. Several
NGOs took up the cause of the affected families with the LHDA and some had 
published their views in international journals, reports, or on-line (see, for exam-
ple, Horta, 1996; Archer, 1996; Hoover, 2001; Panos Institute, 2001). At the local
level, the Highlands Church Action Group (HCAG) and later the Transformation
Resource Centre (TRC) monitored the impacts of the project. They lobbied hard 
for compensation complaints to be resolved equitably and for more effective
development strategies to be  implemented in the highlands (TRC, 2004, 2005;
Thamae & Pottinger, 2006). They also undertook periodic monitoring visits of 
the LHWP areas, talking to local people and holding community meetings. The
NGOs responded when specifi c events occurred, for example, when a crack 
appeared in Mohale Dam in February, 2006, they immediately called for some-
thing to be done about the problem, which was of great concern to people down-
stream as well as to some of the other people  living in the Mohale area.
LHDA’s initial reaction to the appearance of NGOs as advocates of the affected 
families was one of mistrust. The NGOs were seen as interfering in the affairs
of the project and of inciting dissatisfaction. Due to shortcomings in the com-
munication between the people and the LHDA it was agreed to hold regular 
meetings between the NGOs and LHDA. This became a principal means of indi-
rect participation by the people affected by Phase 1A.
A central feature of the planning stage of Phase 1B was its establishment of  formal
structures in the affected communities to facilitate the participation of the affected 
families in the planning and implementation of the program. At this stage the NGOs
had virtually no part in representing the interests of the people to LHDA.
As the project moved from planning into implementation, however, the practi-
cal issues facing families and communities came into sharper focus. The NGOs
found useful roles in helping to identify the problems affecting project-affected 
people and bring them to the attention of the LHDA, the Ombudsman and other 
authorities.(8) In some cases, the NGOs worked with the host communities, those
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communities to whom people from Mohale would be moving. The host popula-
tions were, in a number of instances, concerned about the potential impacts that 
the resettled people would have on resources such as land, grazing, fi rewood, and 
water. In one case, Ha Makotoko in the foothills, 45 families from Mohale were
resettled. Some of them joined what came to be known as Survivors of Large
Dams while others collaborated closely with the host community in road  building
and water projects, drawing on their communal compensation funds which were
used to pay for materials and labor. In this way, both the hosts and the resettlees
were able to benefi t. It should be noted that there were sometimes  tensions between
the hosts and the resettlees, as was the case, for example, at Maji in the  foothills,
where the 6 resettler families were asked by their hosts to pay a M70 fee for 
water, the same as the host population was assessed in the past, but the  resettlees
refused to pay this fee, arguing that it should be covered by LHDA. The host-
resettlee relationships varied signifi cantly in the foothills and lowlands, with many
of the communities with resettled groups getting along  reasonably well, and oth-
ers having differences of opinion about issues ranging from how to use commu-
nal compensation funds to who should be trained in book-keeping and other skills
by LHDA and the Department of Co-operatives. The NGOs and the Ombudsman
highlighted some of these issues in part as a strategy aimed at  getting LHDA to
provide broader and deeper coverage for losses suffered by project-affected peo-
ple.(9) In general, with some minor exceptions, there were relatively few signifi -
cant confl icts between resettlees and the host communities where they moved,
with a notable exception of Makhoakhoeng, where there were disagreements
between the host community and the resettlees over the right to bury deceased 
members of the resettlees in the local cemetery.(10)
THE LHWP PARTICIPATION PROGRAM
The participation program was instituted by LHDA’s Resettlement and Devel-
opment Study consultants in 1996. It began with a tour by the team’s  Resettlement 
and Development anthropologist of the affected villages and of those in the  general
vicinity, informing them of the nature of the project and of the program, and 
encouraging their participation. At a series of village meetings throughout the area
he suggested that they elect an Area Liaison Committee (ALC) to represent a
cluster of villages, and that representatives of each ALC form a Combined Area
Liaison Committee (CALC). This suggestion was adopted enthusiastically and the
committees were duly elected.
There was an existing committee structure in the form of the Village Devel-
opment Committees (VDCs) whose responsibilities cover a wide range of local
affairs, including land allocation which used to be the preserve of the chief or 
village headman. He or she continues to play a prominent, if more democratic,
role in local government. It was important that the new ALCs were not seen as
usurpers of the powers of the chiefs and the VDCs, but that they should provide
support to the existing institutions in the realm of project-related matters, espe-
cially resettlement. Accordingly the chiefs and the VDCs were represented on the
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CALC and this arrangement seemed to work harmoniously.
In addition, it was agreed that the chiefs and the ALCs should appoint young
and educated people from the affected villages as ‘Community Liaison Assistants’,
to be paid by the consultants. The CLAs would be trained by the consultants’
team in their role as communicators and would be continuously brought up to
date on developments within the project. They would convey this information to
the affected families and try to answer the questions of each family concerning
the impacts of the project on them and options open to them. Questions they
could not answer would be referred back to the team and to LHDA. They would 
keep the team briefed on the concerns of the people, assist in the organization
and conduct of ALC and CALC meetings and help with periodic fi eld surveys.
These arrangements contributed to mutual understanding and trust between the
people of the project area and the consultants’ team. The most important element 
in building and maintaining this confi dence was the public participation program
and the structure through which it worked as outlined above. But this was
augmented by other important factors, one of which was that most members of 
the team spent protracted periods living and working in the affected villages.
The land use and soils surveyor spent three months almost continuously in the
area, and became known and liked, featuring briefl y in the football team of one
of the villages he lived in. The fi eld anthropologist (co-author of this paper) and 
his wife lived for about six weeks in one of the largest and oldest villages which
were due to be inundated. Their intention was to acquire a deeper understanding
of the nature of the affected communities and families and of their hopes and 
fears, strengths and vulnerabilities and to help work out a range of acceptable
alternatives to the existing and established pattern of life. When they fi rst arrived 
in the village it soon became clear that many people thought the project was just 
more ‘government talk’ and they considered it physically impossible that their 
entire valley including villages and fi elds would be fl ooded. Some said it was a
ploy by the South Africans in collusion with the Lesotho government to move
people out of the valley so they could extract its mineral wealth. White people
had been seen digging holes in the ground (the soil surveyor) and picking up
stones to take away with them (quartz crystals idly collected by various team
members), which probably meant that there were diamonds there.
After about two weeks of continuous explanation of the project, with the aid of 
maps and aerial photos, incredulity began to be replaced with anger and  indignation
that their government through the LHDA and with the assistance of foreigners (the
consultants’ team) were actually intent upon displacing them from their land and 
separating them from the graves of their ancestors. The fi eld anthropologist was
asked by the village headman to go to the capital and deliver a  letter, composed 
by her and her councillors, addressed to the King, the Prime Minister and the chief 
executive of LHDA. The letter demanded that they come in person to the valley
to explain what was intended, and it announced the refusal of the people to relin-
quish their land to the project. Whether the King and the Prime Minister ever 
received their copies is unknown, but senior offi cials at LHDA were considerably
irritated by the letter and ascribed its origin to ‘agitators’, implying that NGOs or 
possibly even the consultants themselves had been putting ideas into people’s heads.
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The letter to the authorities produced no visits or results.
Within some two months of the team starting work in the project area, most 
of the local people had a fairly good idea of how the project was likely to affect 
them, and those living in the reservoir basin had come to accept the fact that 
they would have to move. Some had begun to think carefully about their desti-
nations and to make tentative plans for groups to resettle together. Some, already
mentioned, decided to return to villages higher up the slope which they had left 
some years before (for a map of the Mohale area showing areas where
 project-affected people could relocate, see Fig. 6). Another substantial group
thought they would move out of the mountains into the foothills region of Leso-
tho to live near their principal chief at Ha Ratau. Others thought their best oppor-
tunities lay in moving to the vicinity of the capital, Maseru.
Fig. 6. Map of the Mohale Dam area showing the Resettlement and Development Zones in the
Highlands.
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It became clear that for most people these options were shots in the dark, for 
they had little if any personal experience of life in these places. Accordingly, the
consultants offered to taxi those who wanted to look for themselves at places
they thought might be suitable for resettlement. The visitors looked at the arable
and grazing opportunities, for spaces in the villages where their houses could be
built, and they held long discussions with chiefs, headmen and farmers. Visits
were also made to Maseru and other towns, to enable those interested in an urban
life to explore the possibilities of living and earning an income there.
This proved helpful in enabling them and the people at home to reach their 
decisions on where to resettle. It also gave the future hosts a chance to assess
the effects of accepting the incomers, which was generally favourable as it was
thought they would come with money from their compensation payments to spend 
on building the new houses and acquiring land.
In the choice of their destinations the resettlers were, subject to conditions
imposed by the Lesotho Government, to a large extent the architects of their own
destinies. They were able to choose between cash payments for their old build-
ings and from a range of several different types of modern housing to be built 
by LHDA in sites of their own choosing. Most families opted for their new
houses and were well pleased with the results. The subsequent challenges of 
economic and social adaptation have had to be met to a large extent by the
families themselves, with a certain amount of ‘enabling’ by LHDA.
One group, comprising 40 families, said that since arable land was scarce in
Lesotho they would like to move to South Africa, just across the border with
Lesotho, on to a farm which LHDA would buy for them. There they would 
establish an agrarian community consisting mainly of serious farmers, but includ-
ing also people with building, mechanical and other practical skills. The main
exponent of this idea was an elderly and infl uential farmer whose notions bore
a remarkable similarity to those of the English social philosopher and experimen-
talist William Morris, who advocated a way of life combining rural simplicity
with craftsmanship. Needless to say, the farmer and his followers had not read 
or heard of the English Arts and Crafts Movement.
The head of LHDA’s Environmental Division urged the consultants’ team to
follow up this suggestion and a number of land agents in the South African
border towns of Ladybrand and Ficksburg were contacted. There was plenty of 
land for sale, the white farmers having become anxious to move out for eco-
nomic and security reasons. The withdrawal of the generous subsidies provided 
by the previous government to white farmers had hit them badly, and many had 
been overwhelmed by debt and forced to sell. Also security along the border was
poor and stock theft, break-ins and assaults on the white faming population were
common. One farm of over 1,000 ha, half of it arable, and adjacent to the  border,
was for sale at a very low price by the bank which had repossessed it. The team
carried out a brief survey and reported that it had all the elements of a suitable
place for the settlement of at least forty families.
The Member of Parliament for the project area and other infl uential politicians
and administrators, including some within LHDA itself, strongly supported the
idea. Other senior offi cials in LHDA, however, ordered a halt to the investiga-
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tion on the grounds that it was too politically controversial. They followed this
up by sending a group of senior chiefs and civil servants to the project area in
two helicopters. They summoned the people to a meeting and demanded that 
there was to be no more discussion of a move to South Africa. They suggested 
that instigators and ‘trouble-makers’ had put this idea into peoples’ heads. Some
of the more outspoken local people at this meeting bitterly denounced LHDA for 
misleading them into believing that they would have a say in their own resettle-
ment and that every option would be considered, and they castigated the chiefs
for deserting them at the time when the people most needed their support.
This was the fi rst major setback to the confi dence of the people in LHDA’s
good will and willingness to conduct the resettlement program as a joint venture.
LHDA, following its initial reaction against the prospect of ‘community-led reset-
tlement’, had announced that the people themselves should take the lead in
identifying places where they would like to resettle. South Africa had been
mentioned by a signifi cant number of affected families at an early stage as one
of the preferred destinations for resettlement. Initially, LHDA had raised no objec-
tions and had indeed asked the consultants to include it as one of the options to
be investigated. As soon as it was taken up by the people as a serious  possibility
some senior LHDA offi cials felt the reins of control slipping from their grasp.
This reversal of policy and the use of heavy political and traditional authorities
to reinforce that decision made many people, even those who had not thought of 
moving to South Africa, question LHDA’s good faith and trustworthiness and 
their own role as participants in the resettlement process.
The message delivered by LHDA at the meeting in the project area had been
uncompromising, and after the delegates had left in their helicopters the mood in
the project area was noticeably subdued. It was several days before people were
willing to talk about their plans again, and when they did they had obediently
deleted South Africa from their list of options. This was a satisfactory outcome
for the authorities, who were plainly relieved to have avoided the need to  continue
confronting this controversial issue. But the price paid for closing the door on
the South African option was a loss of confi dence among the people in the  project 
area that LHDA was genuinely committed to participatory planning of the reset-
tlement program. The fi rst response of the affected people to LHDA’s invitation
to them to participate had been an outright rejection of their proposal and an
accusation against its proponents that their ideas were seditious.
Apart from the political controversy generated by the proposal to resettle in
South Africa there were several technical and administrative arguments against it.
Providing adequate post-resettlement support to the new community would have
been diffi cult for LHDA as it had no mandate to operate outside Lesotho’s national
borders. Cash transfers to the settlers would have been easy, but monitoring and 
follow-up would pass out of the control of LHDA whose mandate it was ensure
that the settlers were not adversely affected by the move. For the Lesotho author-
ities and the World Bank these were substantial objections to the proposal, but 
the proposers, themselves, having little faith in LHDA’s ability to provide  practical
assistance additional to the cash components of the compensation package,  valued 
their own independence and self-suffi ciency and believed they could make a go
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of it on their own.
Some months after the confrontation over the South African option the LHDA 
revived its efforts to cooperate more closely with the affected people, and began
to listen to their concerns. In part this was due to the efforts of  non-governmental
organizations working in the area to promote the interests of local people and to
make known to the international community the problematic issues of compensa-
tion and resettlement.
LHDA’S RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (RDR)
The challenges of post-transition economic and social adaptation have had to
be met to a large extent by the families themselves, with a certain amount of 
support by the LHDA. In addition to direct assistance with transport to the new
sites, the provision of new houses, and the payment of compensation allowances,
LHDA, under its development program, has supported a range of institutions and 
activities including co-operatives, range management associations, and agricultural
extension services for the benefi t of both the resettlers and their hosts.
A total of 54 co-operatives eventually were planned for the Phase 1B upstream
area, and 32 local legal entities were planned for downstream areas. At the time
of writing 29 co-operatives and local legal entities had been established,  registered,
trained, and provided with fi nancial assistance in the form of communal compen-
sation by the LHDA. While some, including the seed potato and maize growing
co-operatives, have clearly fl ourished, others are harder to assess. Co-operatives in
general have a record of failure in Lesotho, and people tend to be wary of com-
mitting their own resources to them. People may enrol as members on a  tentative
basis, to see if the co-operative brings any tangible benefi ts, and if not they leave
after a year or two. The number of co-operatives established therefore gives no
assurance that they will survive or thrive. The Co-operatives Department of the
Ministry of Agriculture is understaffed and the support that it is able to offer 
new co-operatives at this crucial time in their development is therefore limited.
While the implementation of some of LHDA’s development projects was delayed,
a number of project-affected people were able to benefi t from them. Particular 
progress was made in 2003–2004 in seed potato production, thanks in part to a
store with cooling facilities built by funds provided by LHDA and managed by
the farmers’ co-operative at Mohale. There was also some success in promoting
maize production, in spite of the drought at the time. Many people had started 
gardens and were growing a wide range of vegetables.
A number of farmers in the project and resettlement areas were diversifying
by raising chickens for consumption, sale, and egg production. One farmer was
producing a wide variety of vegetables (onions, cabbage, and many others) along
with apples and peaches that he was selling to neighbours and to teachers and 
health workers at the local mission hospital (Ha Mohau in the Lejone area).
Some co-operative members produce and sell tree seedlings, fl owers, vegetables,
and fruits. Co-operatives also produce and sell goods such as coffi ns, face
creams, and crafts. A few co-operatives engaged in money lending using their 
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compensation funds, something that in fact was not allowed under Lesotho co-
operatives policy according to the Department of Co-operatives (personal com-
munication, February, 2009).
As LHDA’s resettlement and compensation program draws to a close, and 
funding for its various components, including the RDP, terminates, the question of 
sustainability becomes paramount. Either the grazing associations (known in Leso-
tho as Range Management Associations), the co-operatives and the other  elements
of the RDP are strong enough to continue on their own, without much external
assistance, or the relevant government ministries and departments will have to
take over the lines of support provided previously by LHDA. At this time there
are no assurances that the new organisations will be able to sustain themselves
or that the government agencies are willing or able to support them. These uncer-
tainties over sustainability are not, of course, confi ned to LHDA’s RDP, but affl ict 
virtually all externally funded development projects and for similar reasons.
RESETTLEMENT AND RELOCATION IN LHWP PHASE 1B
Between the time of the studies and preparations for resettlement, the LHDA’s
consultants worked closely with local communities in the Mohale Basin,  assessing
preferred destinations, fi nding out whether people wished to relocate in the basin
or resettle outside of the mountains, and providing familiarization tours for  people
to potential destinations. On the basis of the familiarization tours, combined with
information on the kinds of housing people would receive and on the compensa-
tion package, individuals began to make decisions as to whether they wished to
relocate or resettle and where they wanted to go.
The consultants made careful measurements of the assets of the households
that were affected by the infrastructure of the project (access roads, tunnels, the
dam area, gravel pits, and construction camps) and of those that would later be
affected by inundation. Forms were fi lled out on each household that became part 
of the Compensation Register. During the course of the 1995/1996 Resettlement 
and Development Study, the consultants measured all arable fi elds below Full
Supply Level of the Reservoir. It was more diffi cult to determine the amount of 
land left to each household and it was not until 2003–2004 that a cadastral  survey
determined these land areas, allowing for an accurate assessment of the total
amounts of arable land possessed by each household.
Once the preferred options of the various project-affected households were
determined, the planning for the actual movement of the households began. LHDA 
agreed to cover the cost of hiring drovers to drive the herds of livestock to new
grazing areas in the highlands or in the foothills. Given the fact that most of the
households were living in areas without roads, arrangements had to be made for 
animal transport to carry the household goods to points where they could be
loaded on trucks and moved.
In Stage 1, the Pre-construction Stage, a total of 99 households were moved,
many of which had been affected by the construction of roads and other project 
works. In line with the preferences expressed by the various households, 37
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households out of 99 were relocated within the Mohale Basin, 38 households
moved to the foothills, and 24 households went to Maseru. The bulk of Stage 1
resettlement took place from 1996 to 1998. Two households opted for self-
resettlement, accepting cash compensation and building their own houses and other 
facilities (e.g. kraals for their livestock) and undertaking the move themselves.
In Stage 2, The pre-inundation Stage, 222 households were relocated or  resettled.
LHDA offered to construct gardens either in the yards of resettler households or 
nearby. Stage 2 resettlement took place in the period from 2002 to 2006. In this
period, 27 households chose to relocate while the rest (N=195) moved either to
the foothills or the lowlands. In some cases, entire villages resettled, but in the
process they dispersed to different destinations.
In Stage 3, Post Inundation, households situated dangerously close to the
reservoir and whose access to their fi elds was cut off, relocated or were moved 
to the foothills. They were in their new homes by 2006. Four people had died,
leaving their property to households that were resettled. In summary, the affected 
households were divided into three stages (see Table 3). Stage 1 and Stage 2
household moves were completed in the period between 1996 and 2006. During
these times, 321 households either relocated in the Mohale Basin or resettled out-
side of the Mohale Basin in the foothills or lowlands (see Fig. 7). Although  individual
families and communities had been able to choose their resettlement destinations,
the choice of a specifi c site for the new house was subject to  limitations, often
imposed by local authorities with whom the resettlers had to negotiate.
Some of the resettler households moved as groups to places in the foothills or 
lowlands that they felt would be receptive to their presence. Thirty six  households
from two of the reservoir-affected communities moved to Ha Makotoko in the
foothills. Twenty two households moved to a housing project at Makhoakhoeng
in Maseru. Resettlers also moved to four other locations in Maseru and ten other 
locations in the lowlands. All told, in Stage 2, households resettled in 16  locations
in the foothills, 10 in the lowlands, and 5 in Maseru. 27 households in Stage 2
relocated to 4 communities in the Mohale Basin. The overall picture is therefore
one of dispersal of the previously stable and integrated mountain communities,
but small groups of relatives or erstwhile neighbours nevertheless remained together,
or at least close to one another, in their new locations.
For many of the households in the Phase 1B area physical resettlement was
followed by a diffi cult period of adaptation and uncertainty. The resettlers had 




Basin Foothills and Lowlands Maseru
Stage 1 37  38 24  99
Stage 2 27 190  5 222
Stage 3 103 103
Total 167 228 29 424
Note: Data obtained from the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority


























































































simultaneously to reconstruct their sources of household income and their rela-
tions with their neighbours, settle their children into new schools, adapt to new
climatic and environmental conditions and learn to manage their new fi nancial
arrangements, which for many had been radically altered by the substitution of 
their familiar land and natural resources with cash payouts. They also had to
adjust in many cases to a whole set of new people in the host villages where
they had resettled.
For the most part, the resettlers integrated reasonably well with their hosts,
especially in the foothills region, entering into sharecropping and land rental
agreements with them and intermarrying. Host villagers sometimes saw the
resettlers as resources since they were coming in with cash from their compen-
sation payments. A worry of some of the host villagers was that having additional
people in their midst would place greater strains upon their grazing, fi rewood,
and water resources. There was particular concern about the addition of substan-
tial numbers of livestock on the range. As it turned out, many people who moved 
out of the highlands left their cattle, sheep, goats, and donkeys behind in the
highlands in the care of relatives or herders hired to manage them so that there
were relatively few new livestock on the range in the foothills.
Initially, Phase 1B resettlers moving to the foothills had diffi culties getting
access to land for crops, in part because host populations asked high prices for 
the land or were reluctant to allow the incomers to rent or sharecrop. As  familiarity
and mutual trust developed the situation began to change and within a few years
virtually all of the resettled households had land of their own, or rented land or 
share-cropped. Also, settlers who started off renting or share-cropping tended to
buy land as they settled in to their new surroundings.
In 2004, decisions had yet to be made about the agricultural fi elds above the
high-water line of the Mohale Dam that LHDA acquired from people who had 
resettled out of the Mohale Basin. It was hoped that people remaining in the
mountains could get access to some of the fi elds left behind by those who left,
but they were not allocated the replacement fi elds that they had been promised,
in part because of uncertainty over the land tenure status of the fi elds. Most of 
these fi elds had been taken over by relatives of re-settlers or by individuals who
encroached on them without permission. Also, the fi elds below full supply level
were generally more productive than those higher up on the slopes around the
basin. Compensation for land lost to the reservoir with land above full  supply
level was therefore bound to be inequitable. Moreover, the resettlement package
included a substantial disturbance allowance that could be invested in agricultural
land or in other income generating opportunities. These factors favoured resettle-
ment to the foothills or the lowlands rather than relocation within the Mohale
Basin. The main attraction of remaining in the Mohale Basin was the relatively
good grazing. Most of those who chose relocation over resettlement were  farmers
whose main interest was in livestock rather than in raising crops.
The households that moved to the capital Maseru found new opportunities as
well as diffi culties. On the positive side, some people were able to take advan-
tage of the urban economic opportunities, investing in malaene, rental property
located close to the industrial area where there were garment factories. These
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were fl ourishing at the time, but by 2005 the massive infl ux of Chinese-made
garments on to the world, as well as Lesotho’s, markets and China’s admission
to the World Trade Organization, led to a crisis in Lesotho’s garment industry.
Most of the factories closed down, leaving large numbers of workers unemployed.
This resulted in a decline in the demand for rental accommodation. Some
individuals took their lump sum compensation payments and invested in taxis, a
highly competitive fi eld. These people were also affected by the economic down-
turn in the textile industry. At the same time the settlers found that living costs
in the city were far higher than in the mountains.
The transition from an agricultural and pastoral life to urban life was fraught 
with uncertainty. One group who had moved to Makhoakhoeng in Maseru, for 
example, found that their hosts refused to allow them to bury one of their 
members who had died there. While this problem was eventually resolved, it was
not before there were calls from the hosts for the settlers to be relocated by
LHDA to another area.(11)
Interviews with people who had resettled in the foothills and lowlands or who
had relocated in the highlands (38 people in 14 communities) revealed a variety
of views on whether they felt themselves to be better or worse off as a result of 
the Highlands Water Project. Half of the households who had moved to the
foothills said that their agricultural yields and commercial sales of agricultural
products were now higher. At the same time, they said that their cash  expenditures
for agricultural inputs such as seeds and fertilizers were far greater. Eight of the
resettlers responded that being separated from their livestock, most of which had 
been left in the highlands, had exposed them to higher losses due to theft. 160
resettler households were, for the fi rst time, selling their surplus maize to the
Lesotho Maize Board out of a total of 260 households. Nearly all of the people
resettled in the foothills and lowlands said that they now had greater access to
social services and markets, but that their costs of living had increased.
Of the 321 households that have had to move as a result of the Mohale
Reservoir, dam and other infrastructure development, 61 opted to relocate locally,
in the Mohale Basin. Some of them felt that they then had to contend with greater 
competition for grazing, arable land, and natural resources such as fi rewood.
People from several communities in the Mohale Basin relocated to a nearby small
village, Ha Koporale, above the water line, in part because of the good grazing
there. On these steep slopes there was hardly any land suitable for arable and 
gardening purposes, a fact obvious to the residents but not, apparently, to the
incomers. When the new settlers arrived in Ha Koporale, they began trying to
acquire land to cultivate, which led to friction with their hosts, and since their 
efforts were largely unrewarded their livelihoods were also affected.
Households headed by women or by elderly people were usually short of labour 
and often found themselves worse off after the LHWP than they were before, in
spite of the Minimum Threshold Payments. The relatives, friends and neighbours
who had previously helped out in the fi elds and with herding had moved away.
Many households split up, with younger members moving to town or starting
new homesteads, leaving behind the elderly people. Information from social
workers in the Mohale Field Operations Branch in October, 2009 indicated that 
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many of the elderly people both in the highlands and in the resettled households
in the foothills lowlands were having a diffi cult time. Some of the elderly were
classifi ed as especially vulnerable by the LHDA Field Operations Branch and 
were receiving assistance in the form of funds and food, a substantial portion of 
these goods provided by individual LHDA offi cers at their own expense.
The various surveys and reports on the affected families(12) show that the LHWP 
had widely differing affects on the households, families and individuals who fell
under its infl uence.(13) Some households increased their incomes by working on
the dam, tunnels, feeder roads, or the water and sanitation projects carried out in
the Mohale area. These were by their nature temporary jobs. Over time, some
households were able to capitalize on development opportunities provided by the
Project or to invest their compensation funds in enterprises such as poultry pro-
duction or rental property. But there were also households whose income levels
fell substantially, especially immediately after resettlement.
After 10 years from the time they resettled, most of the households in the
foothills and lowlands had the use of arable land through sharecropping arrange-
ments, rental, or purchase. They were getting satisfactory harvests, a portion of 
which they were able to sell. Nevertheless, household food shortages were reported 
more frequently than before relocation.
The Minimum Threshold Payment was to be provided to qualifying households
for 10 years. In a study of these households carried out by the Lesotho Bureau
of Statistics in 2004, it was found that more households had fallen below the
minimum threshold level (31 households) and required assistance than had been
able to increase their incomes to the point where they no longer qualifi ed for the
minimum threshold payment (21 households). Minimum threshold payments were
seen by their recipients as crucial to their survival. Without them, they said, they
would be much worse off as a result of the Highlands Water Project. The  prospects
for the Minimum Threshold Payment recipients being economically viable after 
ten years without the livelihood supports are uncertain.
With the help of LHDA Field Operations Branch personnel and agricultural
advisors and the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Self-Suffi ciency, Phase 1B
farmers established their own agricultural co-operative in the foothills. It provides
assistance and inputs to its members who in March 2004 numbered some 1,119,
some of whom were resettlers and some who were residents of host villages. The
co-operative enabled them to obtain the inputs they needed for fi eld preparation
and planting without having to travel to Maseru. LHDA and the Ministry  provided 
extension advice.
Households invested some of their compensation funds in agriculture and income
generating projects, including poultry, pig production, carpentry, hammer mills for 
grinding maize and sorghum, grocery stores, and taxis, a number of which appeared 
to be relatively successful. In general, it appears that the majority of the  households
in the lowlands and some of the households in the foothills have been able to
make a living, sometimes by diversifying in ways that they had not anticipated,
for example, giving up agriculture and livestock production and fi nding jobs, or 
starting businesses such as poultry production, carpentry, raising trees for sale,
running a taxi, selling phone cards or renting out accommodation.
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A critical constraint for many of these households is that they lack members
with the skills to cope successfully in the complex and diversifi ed economy of 
Maseru and its environs. Some of the resettlers had received training in bricklay-
ing and carpentry at the Thaba Tseka Rural Training Centre, but employers did 
not accept their certifi cates as evidence of competence. Others found low paying
jobs, such as domestic workers.
People who had moved to the foothills now had to rent or purchase land,
whereas in the mountains they had access to land that had been granted to them
by traditional authorities. Even when they did get land from local land commit-
tees in the foothills, they had diffi culties in getting what are known as Form Cs
which in Lesotho are proof of land rights. There were cases where people who
had made sharecropping or rental agreements learned that the land owners had 
denied making those agreements and had refused to let them use the land.
 Nevertheless, by 2004 90% of the resettled households at one foothills village
had been able to plant crops.
Some people had purchased land outright from members of the host  population
(the vast majority of whom were Basotho farmers) using funds from their lump
sum compensation and other household resources. Others bought ox carts and then
traded those carts for fi elds. Still others bought one or two fi elds and then rented 
another one or two. Almost half were involved in share-cropping, and even these
households said that they did not have diffi culty making share-cropping arrange-
ments. Members of the host villages, of which there were 44 in the foothills and 
lowlands (see Fig. 8 for a map of the area where people from Mohale were reset-
tled in the foothills and lowlands), generally were willing to  cooperate with the
resettlers, sharing goods and services with them. In some places, such as Ha Maja
in the foothills, resettled households who had formed a co-operative (a local legal
entity) were sharing their communal compensation with host  village members and 
members of a local community councils(14) and the local traditional authority in
paying for labour in the construction of an access road in the  village.
One of the problems that resettler farmers faced was how to get some of the
crops produced in their new areas back up to the mountains so that they could 
supply relatives and people looking after their animals. It was expensive, they
said, to transport grain to the highlands, with charges of M200 for an 80 kg bag
of maize.(15)
The households that had relocated in the Mohale Basin did so because they
had livestock. They were supplementing their income in some cases with high
value marijuana production, despite the loss of the best land for this crop and 
the increased risk of police intervention. Food crops were less important to them
than their other sources of income from marijuana and livestock production, but 
they nevertheless all expressed the desire to have gardens and fi elds.
Some of them wanted to take over the fi elds left by resettlers that were not 
going to be inundated by the Mohale Reservoir. These fi elds were not positioned 
in such a way that they would pose a threat of soil eroding and going into the
reservoir if they were ploughed. Some of the fi elds left behind by resettlers have
in fact continued to be cultivated, sometimes by relatives, and sometimes by other 
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a few fi elds that are cultivated by people from the lowlands and foothills who
come up and plant crops when they are watching over their livestock or  working
on the feeder roads and other project works.
The feeder roads have changed the socio-economic situation in the Mohale Basin.
While travel times and costs associated with bringing in goods have been reduced,
the roads also meant that outsiders had greater access to the highlands. This
includes the police, who were able to reduce the high rate of stock theft, but they
also presented risks for those people growing marijuana on the remaining land.
The fact that the displaced people ended up in different places, some of which
were in new communities in the Mohale Basin and others in the foothills or 
lowlands, meant that their old communities were thoroughly dismantled. One
result of this was it became much more diffi cult for the affected families to
articulate their shared diffi culties and grievances to the authorities.
CONCLUSIONS
I. Were Standards of Living Maintained or Improved?
Even with the relatively(16) small number of families resettled out of the Mohale
Basin it has proven to be diffi cult to assess the degree to which their incomes
and living standards have been restored, either through project-related compensa-
tion and development programs or through their own energies and initiatives.
LHDA was to have undertaken annual household income surveys to provide
answers to these questions and to form the basis of any ameliorative actions
shown to be necessary, but these were not carried out. A survey conducted by
the Lesotho Bureau of Statistics in 2004 found that “There is signifi cant improve-
ment in the lives of the resettled households as evidenced by comparing the
socioeconomic status before and after resettlement” (Bureau of Statistics, 2004:
7). The socio-economic parameters on which the report concentrated were  primarily
access to infrastructure and services (e.g. distances to stand pipes, availability of 
ventilated improved pit latrines and access to transport).
In fact, more households had suffered a fall in income than had improved their 
income following resettlement. The numbers of households with livestock, an impor-
tant source of income and subsistence, had also declined. The Bureau of Statistics
(2004: 6) admitted that the loss of livestock signifi ed a decrease in wealth of the
households, especially since the value of livestock had increased. People who moved 
to the foothills and lowlands that had livestock note that the quality of the grazing
is signifi cantly worse in these areas than in the mountains.
Most of the families resettling in the foothills had been able to plant crops,
but only a relatively small proportion were able to do it on their own land.
Ownership of fi elds had declined drastically since resettlement. Of the 315 house-
holds interviewed, 41 did not own fi elds before resettlement; after resettlement,
the number had increased to 267 (Bureau of Statistics, 2004: 7). Approximately
half of the households interviewed (a total of 152) were engaged in sharecrop-
ping. The number of people renting fi elds had increased from 3 before resettle-
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ment to 30 in 2004. According to the Bureau of Statistics, total crop production
was lower after resettlement than prior to the inception of the project. Agricul-
tural input costs (e.g. for seeds and fertilizers) were high both in the highlands
and the lowlands, though many highlands farmers sent relatives down to the
lowlands to purchase goods. From an economic standpoint, therefore, relocated 
and resettler households were, according to these criteria, measurably worse off 
than they had been previously.
On the other hand, a survey of resettler families undertaken by a contractor in
2000–2001 (Tshabalala & Kisubi, 2003) found that the average cash income had 
increased almost by a factor of three. 80% of this income, however, was derived 
from compensation payments. At the same time, the income generating capacity
of most households had declined, in spite of their having moved closer to cen-
tres of employment and trade. A major cause of this decline had nothing to do
with the project or with the disruption of resettlement, but was due to the mas-
sive reduction in employment opportunities for Basotho on the South African
mines and cutbacks on employment in the garment industry. Another cause was
the completion of the construction contracts for the dams, roads and associated 
works on the Project, with only a few jobs remaining, such as  cleaning of roads
into the project areas, with wages paid by the Department of Roads.
According to the LHDA, 611 households received a total of M2,355 million
in the Mohale area in 2006, an average of M3,584 per project-affected house-
hold. In addition, by the end of 2006, 214 households affected by the LHWP 
received lump sum cash payments totalling M13,030 million, an average of 
M60,886 per household. Downstream households that had formed local legal enti-
ties were paid M3.2 million (Human Sciences Research Council, 2007c: 63).
Phase 1B caused a total loss of 1,275 hectares of arable land. Overall, the
 percentage of agricultural products contribution to household income and subsis-
tence was substantially lower than it was in 1993 at the time of the initial  baseline
investigations of the Mohale area (HSRC, 2007c: 59, Table 5.3). The average
household income level in 1993 was M2,500 per household (Ben Mateka,  personal
communication, 2007). Compensation payments for households that were either 
close to the dam or had chosen to resettle averaged between M6,564 and M8,088
(HSRC, 2007c: 63, Table 5.9). The HSRC (2007c: 72) concluded, therefore, that,
based on income levels before and after the project, largely as a result of com-
pensation payments, project-affected households’ income was the same or better 
and thus, in their view, LHDA had fulfi lled its treaty obligations. However, the
HSRC (2007c: 72) cautioned that the unequal distribution of income in the area
is “a cause of concern.” It should be noted, however, that there are important 
differences between income levels and overall livelihoods.
The households that were doing the best in the Mohale area owned livestock,
had substantial agricultural fi eld and garden areas, and had diversifi ed sources
of income. Based on our own fi eldwork, households that bought or built rental
units with their compensation money, near the main urban centres, saw their 
standards of living increase, at least until relatively recently when they levelled 
off and then began to decline, especially with the downturn in the global econ-
omy in 2008.
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As is often the case with reporting on the outcome of a resettlement program,
the people who have made a conspicuous success of the opportunities offered by
the program are readily identifi able, easily accessible, and may quite legitimately
be held up by the authority as examples of how well the program has worked.
Those who have fared less well are easily lost from sight unless determined 
efforts are made to fi nd them and to determine the causes of their diffi culties.
The post-resettlement economic indicators of household welfare have proved 
very diffi cult to assess. Reliable evaluations of the cultural, social, spiritual and 
personal losses are almost entirely missing, and had these been investigated and 
reported there are no clear remedial actions available. Some losses are irreparable
and cannot be made good by the normal means of compensation. The long-term
effects of the relocation and resettlement of what essentially are ‘development 
refugees’ are yet to be seen. We do know, however, that in line with theoretical
work on resettlement (see McDowell, 1996; Scudder, 1997, 2005; Scudder &
Colson, 1982, 2002; Cernea, 1995, 1997; Cernea & Guggenheim, 1993), LHWP-
affected people experienced physiological, psychological, and sociocultural stress.
Many people grieved for their lost homes and the loss of connections to cultur-
ally and spiritually signifi cant localities. Many of them experienced what Scudder 
and Colson (1982: 271) have referred to as “multidimensional stress.”
It has been argued that the World Bank’s ‘no worse-off’ policies actually work 
against the interest of those caught up in compulsory resettlement programs, in
that this minimum level of economic welfare is too often taken as the target 
(Scudder, 2005: 61–62, 278–285). World Bank policy documents clearly state that 
the affected families should be considered as benefi ciaries of the project which
displaces them, and that a resettlement program should be conceived as a
development program for those affected (World Bank, 1990, 2004a; Picciottio et 
al., 2001). The subsequent dilution of this well-articulated and generally benign
policy may well have had unfortunate results for the ‘project-affected families’
in Lesotho, something pointed out by the TRC (see Thamae & Pottinger, 2006).
Particular concerns raised by NGOs and independent research organizations in
the past several years include high prevalence rates of HIV/AIDS in the project 
area, the need for enhanced economic development activities to offset project-
related impacts, and the reports from local communities of the lack of follow-up
by LHDA on compensation-related cases (TRC, 2004, 2005; HSRC, 2007a–d).
The Ombudsman of Lesotho and NGOs did, however, follow up on compensation-
related cases, and the LHDA moved relatively quickly to resolve those cases.
The World Bank’s Implementation Completion and Results Report for Phase
1B of the LHWP says that the spread of HIV/AIDS as a result of the large
construction workforce associated with the project and improved transport corri-
dors was identifi ed at appraisal one of the most signifi cant social impacts of the
project (World Bank, 2007: 21). There are some indications that the mortality
rate from HIV/AIDS has increased, judging in part from the numbers of  funerals
being  conducted and the popularity of coffi n-making as a means of generating
income for individuals and communities. In the Phase 1A area, the  epidemiological
report of the HSRC (2007a: 56) points out that the rapid increase in the preva-
lence of HIV/AIDS from 1% in 1993 to 24% of the population in 2006 was
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striking. In Mohale, the prevalence of HIV/AIDS was 23.3%, with a lower rate
in the remote areas above Mohale Dam (HSRC, 2007c: 109). The question remains
as to the degree to which the project itself was responsible for that increase.
II. The Parameters of Participation
The notion that the authority to make decisions affecting the use of land and 
water for national purposes is the legitimate preserve of government and its agen-
cies is deeply embedded in the psyche of public offi cials and of the rural people.
It was therefore a brave step when the communities affected by the Mohale
Reservoir took the initiative in deciding where they wanted to resettle, and under 
what conditions they were prepared to leave their familiar environment.
This is the response to the necessity for resettlement which international funding
agencies universally applaud, and indeed require. It was, nevertheless, a response
which deeply disconcerted the responsible offi cials in the project authority, who
felt that their control over the process had been usurped – as indeed, in some
small degree, it had. LHDA’s initial reaction was followed, over a period of some
years, by a gradual reconciliation with the principle that the people affected by
the project have a legitimate claim to some measure of control over their own
destinies, and that by allowing it LHDA was actually facilitating its own task.
The fact that the people had played an active part in determining their own fate
meant that they carried at least some of the responsibility for the outcome. If 
things went wrong, therefore, responsibility could not entirely be laid at the door 
of the project authority.
The offi cial reaction against the affected peoples’ proposal to resettle in South
Africa demonstrated the limits to public participation. But there were other, even
more intractable limitations, arising out of these mountain communities’ limited 
experience of the wider world. Their perspective was illustrated by the terms they
used for their own territory – Maluti, which means a range of mountains – and 
Lesotho, the territory of the dwellers in the lowlands and foothills. A journey to
Lesotho was a major expedition, to a different ‘country’. Their choices of desti-
nation and of the form of compensation payment for their loss of assets, and of 
their future livelihood were constrained by their limited personal exposure to these
novel circumstances.
The communities affected by the Mohale Dam were widely separated from one
another by distance and by the extreme topography. They had no cause, before
the announcement that they were all to be displaced by the new reservoir, to
consider themselves as a single collaborative entity. Now, they were required to
‘participate’ with one another and with the authorities in the planning and imple-
mentation of their own resettlement. The natural tendency was for each affected 
household to focus initially on its own resettlement plans, but with the encour-
agement of the Resettlement and Development fi eld team, groups of households
soon began to form and to consider their joint future. These informal and spon-
taneous groupings did much to provide their members with moral and practical
support in the traumatic period leading up to the move, the move itself, and the
aftermath. But some families, either through choice or default, were left to
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 participate with the authorities on their own. This worked well in some cases,
mainly for the more robust families who looked on resettlement as an opportu-
nity to move into a wider and hopefully more rewarding world, and less well
for the more vulnerable and socially isolated households whose prospects for 
fl ourishing in a new environment were far poorer.
The ability of affected households and individuals to participate, with neigh-
bours and relatives and with the authorities, in the formulation and implementa-
tion of the resettlement program depends very largely on their education, their 
experience in work and in positions of responsibility, and on their health, age
and temperament. Those who are stronger in these respects tend to survive the
resettlement experience and even to prosper, while the weaker tend to participate
less, are heeded less and seldom do as well. It is not at all easy to remedy this
inequality by institutional means, although such measures as the Minimum Thresh-
old Payment go far to help, in the short term at least.
It can be argued that ‘participation’ in the LHWP context was merely window
dressing, that in fact, people were not transformed or empowered to make their 
own decisions. After all, as one of our informants in Mohale noted, “We had no
say whatsoever over whether the dam project was to go ahead, and we could not 
stop it no matter what our opinions were.” A representative of one of the more
infl uential Lesotho NGOs monitoring the LHWP said the participatory approach
which LHDA prided itself on was actually a means of subverting public opposi-
tion to the project and ensuring that people went along with it. Numerous state-
ments were made by local people to the Lesotho Ombudsman and to project 
authorities to the effect that they were not really able to participate in any of the
decisions relating to the implementation of the LHWP. One of the areas that 
project-affected people expressed serious concern about was that involving com-
pensation, and there were numerous complaints at the local level and in the
Lesotho media that the compensation was insuffi cient and that people did not 
have any say in determining the items for which compensation was paid nor the
amounts of funds paid to individuals and communities.
The title of this paper asks the question – who drives resettlement? There was
certainly a strong element of self-determination in the selection of resettlement 
destinations, even though one of the most popular, South Africa, was ruled out 
by the authorities. It is probably safe to say that most people went to the desti-
nation of their choice, and that most, eventually, had a fairly good idea of what 
that choice implied, but they could not foresee the detailed outcome of their deci-
sions, for example, exactly where at the chosen destination their new house would 
be built, how they would manage to acquire arable land and under what terms,
how their relations with their new neighbours would turn out, and how the
economic fl uctuations in their new rural or urban situations would affect them.
III. Was This a Successful Resettlement Program?
As resettlement programs go, this one certainly ranks above average. The  people
were well informed, long in advance of their having to move, of the nature of 
the project that was to displace them, of the likely sequence of events leading
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up to the move, and of the options open to them. They were helped and encour-
aged to organise themselves, and their destinations, despite the veto on South
Africa, were chosen by the community members themselves. The project-affected 
people were provided with new houses, to a higher standard than their old ones,
at these destinations. They were compensated for their loss of land and other 
income-earning opportunities, and for most, access to clean water, sanitation,
schools, health services and transport was improved substantially.
Once having arrived at their destinations the re-settlers were largely responsible
for re-building their own economies. As we have seen, some did well and  others
poorly. Some people ended up landless, depending heavily on the compensation
that they received. There were also those who ended up without jobs or produc-
tive work, and some individuals became destitute, particularly elderly individuals
and ones who were physically or psychologically incapacitated.
The support for income-generating and agricultural activities provided by the
LHWP was well-intentioned and well-funded, but with few exceptions it was
ineffectual. Despite the experience of the RDP in Phase 1A and the avowed inten-
tion to learn from this and to do it better in Phase 1B, it fell far short of its
declared aim of improving the livelihoods and environments of the affected people.
There is a tendency among politicians and high-ranking aid  offi cials to assume that 
more investment means less poverty. The RDP of both of LHWP’s phases disproves
this assumption. Not only could the allocated funds not be spent, but that which
was spent had a meagre effect.
The intangible sense of loss expressed by many of the re-settlers, especially
by those for whom the move had not brought the compensations of affl uence,
was something the Project could hardly address. The fact that people had chosen
their destinations and their hosts, and that the hosts in most cases had welcomed 
their arrival, to some extent alleviated the pain of separation from ancestral homes,
but this is probably something that time alone can heal.
There are many instances in the recent history of resettlement programs where
the prevailing international norms have been followed assiduously in the planning
phase, and generally ignored in the implementation (World Commission on Dams,
2000; Cernea & McDowell, 2000; Scudder, 2005; Panel of Environmental Experts,
2009). A reason for this discrepancy is that the preparation of adequate plans, in
conformity with international standards, is necessary for the release of the  international
funds for the project, while their implementation is largely under the control of the
government ‘owning’ the project. The international funding  agencies tend to lose
their grip on the project once the funds have been granted, and  especially once
implementation has begun. The fi nancial and political consequences of closing down
the fl ow of funds to a project once it is under construction can be very dire as
contractors can claim heavy damages for delays not of their own making.(17)
As to whether this was a ‘successful’ resettlement program, it can be said that 
it was better than most, but still suffered from the endemic defects of similar 
disruptions imposed on people world-wide. In general, the more robust families
and individuals use the resources provided by a well planned and benign resettle-
ment and compensation program to realise ambitions that were constrained in
their previous environment, and some ended up in what they themselves consider 
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an improved situation. Those who are less able to adapt to change, and who are
dependent on the wide range of benefi ts provided by a stable and traditional
village community, typically do less well, and often do poorly. They are often
diffi cult to follow and diffi cult for the authorities to support following the move
and the disintegration of their community. In poor countries it is hardly practical
or politically expedient to provide continuous support for a small and specifi c
group of poor people, while others, equally deprived, but for different reasons,
have no such state assistance.
After some years following resettlement the authorities tend to lose interest in
the fate of the people displaced by the project, and the institutional capacity to
continue the follow-up work on behalf of the disadvantaged ones also diminishes
as key staff and resources move on to other more immediately demanding tasks.
The degree to which individuals and communities can participate in project-related 
decisions also changes. In the case of Phase 1B of the LHWP, the nature of 
 participation changed as the project wound down. The community-level  consultation
institutions met less often, and the LHDA abolished the Community Liaison Assis-
tants who had been so instrumental in helping facilitate the resettlement and post-
resettlement process.
Whether these defects could be remedied by the rigorous application of the
kind of detailed prescriptions offered by the World Commission on Dams is
unclear so far, but in our opinion it seems improbable. Requirements as  demanding
and complex as the World Commission on Dams are unlikely to be sustained 
after the construction period. The World Commission on Dams (2000: 176) noted 
that “The most unsatisfactory social outcomes of past dam projects are linked to
cases where affected people played no role in the planning process, or even in
selecting the place or terms of their resettlement.” In the case of the LHWP,
people affected by Phase 1B of the project were consulted about many issues
ranging from compensation to resettlement; they got to choose where they would 
be relocated or resettled; and they undertook much of the relocation themselves,
with some assistance from Project authorities. Their economic rehabilitation was
to a large extent in their own hands. What was not in their hands, however, was
the decision about whether to undertake the project that affected their lives so
substantially.
Local people in the highlands and resettlement areas sought assistance from
outsiders, including the Lesotho Ombudsman. NGOs, including the HCAG, the
TRC, Christian Aid, and the International Rivers Network sought to enhance the
degree to which project-affected people were consulted. The World Bank and the
Panel of Environmental Experts continuously urged the LHDA to be more respon-
sive to the concerns of local people and NGOs and were sometimes, but not 
always, heeded.
Public participation is often cited as a crucial part of successful development 
policy and practice, linked closely to empowerment and social justice (World 
Bank, 1996; Chambers, 2005). There are, however, questions regarding whether 
or not participation has resulted in signifi cant social gains, due in part to failure
to engage with issues of politics and power (see Cooke & Kohari, 2001; Hickey
& Mohan, 2005). Devolution of power to local authorities, particularly those at 
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the village level in Lesotho, has proceeded only to a limited extent. With respect 
to the LHWP, most decisions are made by the project authority, and people in
the project area have relatively little choice but to go along with them. One of 
the major issues raised by NGOs in Lesotho is the limited degree to which local
people can infl uence elites and the larger power structure in general.
Public participation in the LHWP did, however, help to reduce confl ict and 
bring about changes in resettlement policy. This can be seen, for example, in the
case of Stage 3 (Residual) resettlement, where the governments of Lesotho and 
South Africa and the LHWC, after much discussion with project-affected people
and the organizations working with them, decided to allow those households in
the areas immediately surrounding the Mohale Reservoir to have land in the
Mohale Basin to replace the land that they lost and, potentially, to have the option
to resettle outside the area if they so chose to do so. The Residual Resettlement 
Policy, which took over two years to draw up, argued for participation of local
people in decision-making, though the procedural steps and mechanisms for this
participation were not laid out in detail (LHDA, 2009). The real challenge now
will be for the LHDA to take seriously the demands of the project-affected  people
to ensure that all of those households affected by the LHWP are better off socially,
economically and spiritually over the long term.
IV. Concluding Questions
The real cost of a resettlement and compensation program such as that outlined 
here is hardly possible to calculate. The funds disbursed directly to affected fam-
ilies and spent on various development programs are known and recorded, but 
the cost of the various and frequent visits of World Bank missions, Panels of 
Experts and other specialists, and of other international agencies, over two decades
has not, to our knowledge, been computed. To these must be added the prolonged 
and substantial input of the several NGOs involved in the project. When these
‘direct’ and ‘peripheral’ costs have been summed, several questions arise:
•  Of the total real costs of the program and its supervision and administration,
what proportion could be counted as direct and tangible benefi t to the affected 
families?
•  Assuming, as we suspect, that a signifi cantly higher proportion of the total
costs has been spent on what we here refer to as ‘peripherals’, and not spent 
on direct and tangible benefi ts, can this be justifi ed in terms of the outcomes
for the affected families? Is there not a better and more ‘direct’ way of using
the money spent on the peripherals?
•  Most of the peripheral cost is incurred in monitoring, evaluation, and persua-
sion of the responsible authority to do better by the affected families and 
their environment. If the authority itself was fully committed to these ends,
would there still be a need for the now customary external intervention?
The LHDA, at its fi nal stakeholders’ conference held in October, 2006, billed 
the LHWP as ‘a model for success.’ The question remains, is a project that has
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had mixed results in terms of social, economic, and environmental impacts really
a ‘model’ to be replicated? Some valuable lessons have been learned, granted.
The project has reached some of its objectives, providing water to South Africa
and electricity to Lesotho. Not all of the project-affected households have had 
their livelihoods restored to the point where they were before fi rst disturbance.
From the standpoint of some of the households involved in the project, they are,
as Thamae and Pottinger (2006) have described, ‘on the wrong side of develop-
ment.’ Others have clearly benefi ted from the LHWP, increasing their incomes
and raising their living standards.
Development is tied closely to bureaucracy as well as to strategies aimed at 
enhancing livelihoods and social well-being (Hitchcock & Holm, 1993; Tendler,
1997; Scudder, 2005; Derman & Hellum, 2007). The LHWP, with its emphasis
on protecting the environment and promoting social and economic development,
is, in some ways, a classic example of a mixture of top-down and bottom-up
development and participation. The degree to which resettlement was based on a
‘do-it-yourself’ principle in the LHWP varied, depending on the willingness of 
project authorities to allow decision-making by project-affected people. When it 
came to allowing local people the option of staying or going, the LHDA and 
other stakeholders in the Lesotho Highlands struggled over the notions of democ-
racy, participation, and devolution of authority to the local level.
Most of the available evidence on the fate of the resettlers suggests that the
resettlement program has opened new opportunities to the economically fi t, who
have adapted to their new circumstances and in some cases have prospered. Those
people who were vulnerable are now, in general, poorer, less healthy and survive
largely on the minimum threshold payments, which will begin expiring within
the next few years. Their prospects thereafter are uncertain, but not bright. The
majority of the project-affected people who were resettled or relocated have had 
a portion of their livelihoods restored through compensation but from their own
perspectives largely are worse off they were before the project began.
The Mohale Dam resettlement program was elaborately planned, generously
funded and closely monitored to ensure that, as far as possible, none of the more
than 400 affected families ended up worse off than before. The planners were
acutely aware of the unforeseen effects that other resettlement programs in Leso-
tho and worldwide had had for their subjects and devised a program intended to
avoid following these unhappy examples. The outcome of their well-meant efforts
was often far off the mark.
The stark message from this and other resettlement programs is that the strong
prosper while the weak cannot withstand the social, cultural and economic
disruption of forced removal and must be treated as wards of the state for a long
if not indefi nite period. Efforts have to be made to ensure that both upstream
and downstream populations are able to benefi t from compensation and develop-
ment programs. The economic rehabilitation of poor and weak families, however,
is a process as yet little understood.
It remains to be seen whether the LHWP will be characterized as a successful
model of ‘do-it-yourself’ resettlement or one that, as some NGOs have argued,
has increased dependency. Clearly, transparency, accountability, and broad stake-
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holder participation are crucial in the planning and implementation of large dam
projects if they are to achieve the multiple goals of benefi ting local people, nation-
states, and the regions in which they are established.
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NOTES
(1) The World Commission on Dams report had not appeared when the program was being
planned and during the early stages of its implementation.
(2) For descriptions of the rural economy of Lesotho, see Turner (1978, 2000); Murray
(1981); Ferguson (1994); World Bank (1994); and Sechaba Consultants (2000).
(3) LHDA Treaty (Government of Lesotho and Government of South Africa, 1986: 27).
(4) Arable land in Lesotho is a public asset. Farmers do not own their fi elds in any freehold 
sense, but hold rights of usufruct. Land rights are retained by continuous use and are
relinquished when the land is no longer cultivated. The land is then re-allocated by the
local authorities. In recent times, with increasing scarcity, land has been transferred 
informally and privately, in what amounts to sale.
(5) In Phase 1A (The Katse Dam) the compensation period was 15 years. It was intended 
that the rural development program would by that time have increased incomes to pre-
relocation levels. It soon became evident, especially to the recipients, this was unlikely
to happen.
(6) How to ‘safeguard’ the capital sum awarded as compensation to a family is, nevertheless,
problematic. The capital is actually the property of the family, and it could be legally and 
practically impossible to prevent the head of the family from disposing of his capital as
he wishes.
(7) Until recently the right to use arable land was allocated to a family by a local chief or 
headman, and more recently by a local land allocation committee. The land itself 
remained the property of the nation. There was no such thing as land ownership. This has
changed and land is now increasingly bought and sold.
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(8) NGOs and other critics of the LHWP pointed to the fact that corruption trials held in
Lesotho led to the conviction of the Chief Executive of the LHDA and several large dam
construction companies including Acres International of Canada and Lahmeyer Interna-
tional of Germany. In November, 2006, the World Bank declared Lahmeyer to be
ineligible for the awarding of World Bank contracts for a period of seven years. As the
World Bank’s Implementation Completion Report on Phase 1B of the Lesotho Highland 
Water Project (World Bank, 2007: 2) noted, “The experience of the LHWP and the
 pro-active role of the government of Lesotho have been used widely as a case study of 
good governance, highlighting how small, developing states can successfully prosecute
some of the largest multinational fi rms in the world.”
(9) In these cases, the hosts, some of whom were relatives of families being resettled, were
considered project-affected people as much as those individuals who lost their homes
and fi elds and other assets to the dam and related infrastructure.
(10) For a discussion of the issues of confl icts and confl ict management among people who
were relocated or resettled as a result of the LHWP Phase 1B, see Bildhaeuser (2010).
(11) See the studies by Keketsho (2003); Shale (2003); Thabane (2000); Braun (2005); and 
Mwangi (2007, 2008).
(12) See Horta (1996); Archer (1996); Panos Institute (2001); Transformation Resource
Centre (2004, 2005); and Thamae and Pottinger (2006).
(13) Households in Lesotho generally consist of one or more extended families that are tied 
together through marriage, kinship, or friendship; they often share a compound and may
cook and eat together at least some of the time. Nuclear families usually consist of a
husband, wife, and children and sometimes elderly parents or relatives. Basotho gener-
ally are patrilineal and patrilocal, although there is signifi cant variation in residence and 
descent. As Braun (2005: 35) notes, “Despite the residence pattern chosen, the strength
of patrilineal kin groups remains strong.”
(14) Community councils are local government bodies established under the Lesotho Local
Government Act 1997 (as amended). These councils are corporate bodies consisting of 9
to 15 members who are elected periodically in local government elections. These coun-
cils are supposed to engage in local level development and conservation activities, and 
they play a role along with traditional authorities (chiefs) in land allocation and 
management. They differ from co-operatives which are local legal entities established 
under the Co-operatives Societies Act of 2000; these are membership organizations to
which  individuals pay an annual fee which engage in activities such as craft production
and marketing, agriculture, and running hammer mills (installations used to grind maize
and other grains).
(15) At the time, a Maluti was equivalent to M7=US$1.
(16) This is relative to other big dam resettlement programs in which thousands, if not tens of 
thousands, of families have been moved. See Lawson (1982); World Bank (1994);
Dorcey et al. (1997); Cernea & McDowell (2000); World Commission on Dams (2000);
McCully (2001); Khagram (2004); Scudder (2005); Oliver-Smith (2009).
(17) Perhaps times are changing in this regard. The international development bank funding
the Naga Hammadi Barrage on the River Nile ordered a halt to construction until the
affected households had been compensated and resettled as agreed.
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